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From World War II until the present, the U.S. military has not been able to 
defeat theater missiles attacks. Post-war analysis of attack efforts during World War 
II and the Persian Gulf War could not identify a single instance when either a German 
V weapon or an Iraqi SCUD was destroyed before launch. During the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, the best estimate that the Air Force could provide the National Command 
Authority was that ninety percent of the Soviet missiles in Cuba would be destroyed 
by an airstrike. 
To correct this deficiency, the military developed joint theater missile defense 
(JTMD) doctrine. This doctrine attempts to integrate synergistically all U.S. military 
assets and capabilities. However, this doctrine does not fully integrate special 
operations forces (SOF) into attack operations against theater missiles. Additionally, 
the joint tactics, techniques, and procedures needed to implement this doctrine have 
not been developed. The integration of SOF's capability to conduct pre-strike and 
post-strike reconnaissance, critical material recovery operations and target acquisition 
tasks can immediately improve JTMD capabilities. 
v 
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XIV 
- EXEClITIVE SUMMARY 
Since the first use of V-1 flying bombs and V-2 rockets by Germany in 
World War II, to the use of the SCUDs by Iraq in the Persian Gulf War, the U. 
S. military has not been able to defeat enemy theater missile (fM) attacks. 
Within the U.S. military, each service conducts TM defense and/or interdiction 
operations. These separate operations have been poorly coordinated and 
produced only limited success despite the superiority of U.S. air and land 
power. The Air Force attempts to destroy TMs, their transporter-erector-
launchers (fELs), and supporting infrastructure. Meanwhile, special operations 
forces (SOF) also conduct special operations (SO) to destroy TMs, their TELs, 
and supporting infrastructure. If separate Air Force and SOF efforts fail to stop 
TM launches, Army air defense assets attempt to destroy the TMs in their 
terminal stage of flight. Singly, none of these operations can guarantee 
destruction of the enemy TMs. Meanwhile, civilians, usually the intended 
enemy targets, have been left to hide in their basements or bomb shelters. 
This thesis defines TMs as ballistic, cruise, and air-to-surface missiles 
with ranges over 260 kilometers that carry payloads over 300 kilograms, but 
whose targets are within a given theater of operations. This definition 
combines the Joint Staff definition of TM, the Missile Technology Control 
Regime's missile definition, and considers the area of influence and the range 
of maneuver and fire support assets under the command of an Army ground 
commander. 
xv 
Since the Persian Gulf Conflict, the U.S. military is working to develop 
a coherent joint theater missile defense (JTMD) doctrine and the joint tactics, 
techniques, and procedures (JTTPs) to implement it. The JTTPs are the "how 
to" actions and methods that implement joint doctrine. There is a weakness in 
current JTMD doctrine and JTTPs. The unique capabilities of SOF are not 
integrated into attack operations against TMs. This weakness is critical. Some 
form of "eyes on target" is needed at one or more phases of an attack operation 
to ensure success in destroying TMs aimed at politically or militarily significant 
targets. Special operations forces can provide those eyes. 
The integration of SOF into JTMD doctrine and JTTPs can immediately 
improve JTMD attack operations capabilities. Improving JTMD attack 
operations capabilities increases the probability of success for the other 
elements of JTMD doctrine. Prior to a strike, SOF can assist in the detection, 
identification, and acquisition of TMs, its TELs, or supporting infrastructure. 
If necessary, SOF can assist Air Force assets strike TM targets by using 
terminal guidance or beacon capabilities. If immediate confirmation of 
destruction of a TM target is critical, SOF can conduct post-strike 
reconnaissance/battle damage assessment and determine the extent of the 
damage to the TM target. If necessary, SOF can coordinate follow-on strikes 
to ensure destruction of the TM target. Finally, if recovery of TM components 
is critical for military, intelligence, political or environmental value, SOF has 
that capability as well. 
XVI 
This thesis examines the question: What is the role of SOF in operations 
against TMs? It uses a comparative case analysis of three historical cases 
involving U.S. and Allied/Coalition attempts to destroy or interdict TMs. The 
first is Allied efforts to stop German V weapons' attacks during World War II. 
The second is U.S. and Coalition attempts to stop Iraqi SCUD attacks during 
the Persian Gulf War. The final case examines U.S. military planning efforts 
to destroy Soviet missiles in Cuba during the Cuban Missile Crisis. All three 
cases demonstrate the difficulty of destroying TMs without some form of "eyes 
on target" at one or more phases of an attack operation. 
XVII 
XVlll 
I. DEFENDING AGAINST MISSILE ATTACKS 
The U. S. military is unable to defeat enemy theater missile (fM) attacks. 
There are three internal reasons for this inability. First, our military lacks 
effective joint theater missile defense doctrine (JTMD). 1 Second, our military 
lacks the joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (JTTPs) to implement 
effective JTMD doctrine. Third, the lack of effective JTMD doctrine and JTTPs 
prevents special operations forces (SOF) from being integrated into operations 
against TMs. The solution requires the United States military to do three 
things. First, it must develop comprehensive JTMD doctrine that overcomes the 
existing competing and incompatible service oriented concepts that plague 
current JTMD doctrinal efforts. Second, our military must develop effective 
JTTPs that implement this JTMD doctrine. Third, our military must ensure that 
SOF is incorporated into the improved JTMD doctrine and the JTTPs that 
implement it. 
Since the first use of V-1 flying bombs and V-2 rockets by the Germans 
in World War II, missile attacks have been difficult to defend against. Within 
the U.S. military, each service conducts defense and/or interdiction operations 
against enemy missiles.2 These separate operations have been poorly 
1Doctrine is the fundamental principles that guide the actions of military forces. It is authoritative but 
requires judgment in application. Joint indicates that all of the seIVices use the same doctrine. (Office of the 
Chairman, Joint Pub. 1·02, 1994, pp. 120 and 200) 
20perations are combat or other military actions to achieve specific objectives (Office of the Chairman, Joint 
Pub 1-02, 1994, p. 275). Operations are larger in scale and refer to general types to activities or capabilities. 
Missions refer to a specific military task that clearly indicates the actions to be taken and the reason therefor. 
Missions generally referred to a duty assigned to a specific unit (Office of the Chairman, Joint Pub 1-02, 1994, p. 
1 
coordinated and produced only limited success despite the superiority of U.S. 
air and land power.3 The Air Force attempts to destroy enemy TMs, their 
transporter-erector-launchers (fELs), and supporting research, manufacturing, 
and transportation infrastructure. Meanwhile, SOF also conducts special 
operations (SO) to destroy enemy TMs, TELs, and supporting infrastructure.4 
If Air Force and SOF efforts fail to prevent enemy TMs from being launched, 
Army air defense assets attempt to destroy the TMs in their terminal stage of 
flight. Singly, none of these operations can guarantee destruction of enemy 
TMs. Meanwhile, civilians, usually the intended enemy targets, have been left 
to hide in their basements or bomb shelters. 
A. THE DEFINITION OF THE THEATER MISSILE 
This thesis defines TMs as ballistic, cruise, and air-to-surface missiles 
with ranges over 260 kilometers that carry payloads over 300 kilograms, but 
whose targets are within the same theater of operations. This definition 
combines the Joint Staff definition of TM, the Missile Technology Control 
Regime's (MTCR) missile definition, and considers the area of influence of an 
Army ground commander. 
245). 
3Duringthe Persian Gulf War, initial reports indicated that conventional and SOF strikes against TMs, their 
TELs, and infrastructure were successful. Further analysis revealed the inaccuracy of the initial reports. (Miller, 
1992, p. A-24; Powell, April 1992, pp. 48-53: Powell, October 1992, pp. 32-35; Schneider and Fink, 1991, pp. 12-13) 
4Special operations are conducted by SOF to achieve military, political, economic, or psychological objectives 
by unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. Special operations differ from 
conventional operations in the degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, 
independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence. (Office of the Chairman, 
Joint Pub 3-05, 1992, p. GL-20) 
2 
r--------------------------------------- -
The Joint Staff defines TMs as: 
ballistic, cruise, and air to surface missiles whose targets are 
within a given theater of operations. Short range, non-nuclear, 
direct fire missiles, bombs, and rockets such as Maverick or wire-
guided missiles are not considered TMs. (Office of the Chairman, 
Joint Pub. 3-01.5, p. 1-2)5 
The phrase, "within a given theater of operations," excludes intercontinental 
ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable of reaching the United States as a TM threat. 6 
The term theater missile is used because the U.S. military's war fighting 
strategy delegated the theater commander in chief (CINC) to fight wars.7 This 
thesis builds on the Joint Staff definition of TM. It considers current related 
academic literature and applicable U.S. military doctrine. 
Current academic literature calls TMs theater ballistic missiles (TBMs), 
tactical missiles, or short-range missiles. One definition of TBM is "a missile 
with a range of 600-3000 kilometers." Tactical or short-range missiles have 
been defined as "missiles with a range between 0-600 kilometers." (Y arymovych, 
1995, p. 1) 
5A laser guided bomb (LGB) has a range of up to seven miles. A maverick air to ground missile has a range 
of up to fifteen miles. The standoff land attack missile (SLAM) has a range of over fifty miles. (Department of 
Defense, 1992, pp. 775, 777, and 782) 
6Intercontinental ballistic missiles have a range of 4000 miles or more (Smart, 1969, p. 2). 
7A theater is defined as a geographic area outside the continental U.S. for which a combatant commander 
command has been assigned responsibility. Examples of U.S. theater commands include European Command 
(EUCOM), Central Command (CENTCOM), Pacific Command (PACOM), etc .. The combatant commander is also 
called the unified commander or theater commander in chief (CINC). The theater CINC's command authority is 
established by Title 10 U.S. Code. He has authority to organize forces, assign tasks, designate objectives, and give 
authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations including joint and combined operations. (Office of 
the Chairman, Joint Pub, 1-02, 1994, pp. 385 and 74) This thesis will use the term theater CINC exclusively. 
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~~~-----------------------------------~ 
A better definition of TM can be found within the MTCR. The MTCR is 
a voluntary regime designed to limit the export of missile technology capable 
of delivering weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).8 The MTCR places two 
limits on the export of missiles and missile technology. The first limit restricts 
the transfer of technology that would enable a state to build a missile with a 
range of greater than 300 kilometers. The second limit restricts the payload of 
the same missile to less than 300 kilograms. (Spector, McDonough, with 
Medeiros, 1995, pp. 185-187) These limits restrict the possibility that a missile 
could carry a WMD any significant distance. 
Military doctrine defines an area of interest as "a geographic area in 
which a commander is directly capable of influencing operations by 
maneuvering forces or employing fire support assets normally under that 
commander's command or control" (Office of the Chairman, Joint Pub 1-02, 
1994, p. 33). This thesis uses 260 kilometers as the maximum depth of the 
ground commander's area of interest. It is used because 260 kilometers is the 
combat radius of the AH-64 Apache attack helicopter (Department of Defense, 
1992, p. 669). This is the longest range weapon that an Army ground 
commander has under his command or control to conduct deep attack 
operations. 
8Weapons of mass destruction are weapons capable of a high order of destruction. They can be nuclear, 
chemical, biological, or radiological weapons. Radiological weapons employ radiological materials or radiation 
producing devices to cause casualties or restrict the use of terrain. This definition excludes the means of 
transporting or propelling the weapons where such means is a separate or divisible part of the weapon. (Office 
of the Chairman, Joint Pub 1-02, 1994, p. 412) 
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B. THEATER MISSILE THREAT SCENARIOS 
If an aggressor state does not possess TMs, then there is no TM threat. 
If an aggressor state possesses TMs, then there are three possible scenarios for 
the use of TMs. In the first scenario, an aggressor state has TMs armed only 
with conventional warheads. World War II and the Persian Gulf War are two 
examples of this type of scenario.9 In the second scenario, an aggressor state 
has a small number of TMs possibly armed with WMDs. The Cuban Missile 
Crisis is an example of this scenario. 10 The third scenario involves a state that 
has a TM force armed with sufficient WMDs to have a credible second-strike 
retaliatory capability. Once an aggressor state deploys more than a small force 
level of TMs armed with WMDs, that state might then possess a credible 
second-strike retaliatory capability. The Cold War period after the Cuban 
Missile Crisis, between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the current 
Post-Cold War period, between the United States and Russia, are examples of 
this scenario. 
This thesis examines the first two scenarios described above. Attack 
operations against conventionally armed TMs or against a small number of TMs 
armed with WMDs can only be successful in these two types of scenarios. A 
9Despite initial United States concerns about the possible use of chemical warheads on SCUD missiles by Iraq, 
military planning indicates that these weapons were soon considered militarily insignificant by the CINC and his 
staff. 
1
°This thesis takes the stance that the Soviets risked placing nuclear armed missiles in Cuba to overcome the 
eighteen to one advantage in nuclear weapons the United States had over the Soviets. With that great disparity, 
the Soviets would not risk a nuclear war with the United States. As long as the United States only used 
conventional air and ground forces in Cuba, the Soviets only option was horizontal expansion of conflict on some 
other front, such as Berlin. 
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small force level of WMDs is not numerically defined in this thesis. It is not 
defined because the particular geopolitical circumstances, U.S. military 
capabilities, and U.S. domestic political concerns will impact on the National 
Command Authority's (NCA) determination of what number of TMs, possibly 
armed with WMDs, constitutes a credible second-strike capability. 11 
C. THE THEATER MISSil..E PROBLEM 
There are four factors, outside the control of the U.S. military, which 
prevent current U.S. doctrine from enabling our forces to defend against TMs. 
These four external factors make up the TM problem. First, TMs produce a 
political impact beyond all proportion to their military significance. The 
significant political impact stems from the practice of using TMs against civilian 
population centers. 12 The political impact forces the military commander to 
make last minute changes to his plan of operation in response to unanticipated 
political pressure. These last minute changes may reduce the effectiveness of 
United States military capabilities. 
Second, three TM characteristics and four TM employment techniques 
limit the capability of the United States military to defend against TMs. These 
TM characteristics are mobility, ease of concealment, and ease of maintenance 
"The NCA consists of the President and the Secretaiy of Defense together or their duly deputized alternates or 
successors. The term NCA is used to signify constitutional authority to direct Armed Forces in their execution of 
militaiy actions. (National Defense University, 1993, p. 2·2) 
12 Besides the extensive use ofTMs in World War lI and the Persian Gulf Conflict, both Iran and Iraq used SCUD 
missiles extensively against each other's cities from 1982-1988 (McNaugher, 1990, p. 9). 
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and resupply. 13 The employment techniques include the use of deception, 
decoys, dispersion, and using civilians as shields. These characteristics and 
employment techniques compound an already difficult problem of detection, 
identification, continuous tracking and acquisition of targeting information, 
allocation of forces to strike, and finally striking to neutralize or destroy TMs. 14 
Third, TMs, both state of the art and simple systems, have proliferated 
throughout the world. This enables poor states to threaten U.S. national 
interests. Finally, if a TM is possibly armed with a WMD, any operation to 
destroy or neutralize it must be successful. Failure could be catastrophic. 
D. A PARTIAL SOLUTION - JOINT THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE 
Since the Persian Gulf Conflict, the U.S. military has been working to 
develop a coherent theater missile defense strategy. It is called joint theater 
missile defense (JTMD) doctrine. Joint theater missile defense: 
applies to the identification, integration, and employment of forces 
supported by theater and national capabilities, to detect, identify, 
allocate, track, minimize the effects of, and/or destroy enemy TMs. 
(Office of the Chairman, Joint Pub 3-01.5, p. I-2) 
13During the Persian Gulf Conflict, many Iraqi modified SCUD missiles were fired from fixed, smveyed sights. 
Even these permanent sites were not completely destroyed or continuously monitored (Powell, October 1992, p. 
33). 
14Destruction is damaging a target until it is unusable and can not be repaired (Office of the Chairman, Joint Pub 
1-02, 1994, p. 261). Neutralization, on the other hand, is a lower level of damage that renders a target ineffective 
or unusable. The target can still be dangerous and repairable (Office of the Chairman, Joint Pub 1-02, 1994, p. 
378). 
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The term 'joint" connotes activities, operations, etc., involving forces from more 
than one U.S. military service (Office of the Chairman, Joint Pub 1-02, 1994, p. 
200). The need to integrate synergistically the different military services of the 
United States became apparent after the invasion of Grenada in 1983. Since 
Grenada, the U.S. military has attempted to integrate synergistically all U.S. 
Military Services and their capabilities. Joint doctrine is also supposed to 
integrate special operations forces and capabilities. 
In 1986, Congress, through the Goldwater Nichols Act, decided to help 
the U.S. military with its efforts to become joint.15 Prior to 1986, each military 
service was primarily responsible for developing its own strategy, doctrine, 
tactics, training, weapons, and equipment. Since 1986, the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff has been given the authority, responsibility, and assets to 
implement jointness. 
Additionally, to ensure that SOF was effectively integrated into joint 
service doctrine, Congress established the United States Special Operations 
Command (USSOCOM). United States Special Operations Command is a 
unified command. It exercises command over all Army, Navy, and Air Force 
SOF units located in the continental United States. Part of USSOCOM's 
mission is to prepare assigned forces to carry out SO. Its functions include 
developing strategy, doctrine, tactics, and training for all SOF (United States 
15For further information see Di Rita, L. T., "Evolution of Jointness: The Color Purple," Proceedings, May 1995, 
p. 104. 
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Special Operations Command, 1988, pp. Intro-4 and 2-6). This mission is nearly 
identical to the missions of each of the individual military services. 
Special Operations Forces (SOF) are military units of the Army, Navy, 
and Air Force designated for special operations (SO). They are organized, 
trained, and equipped specifically to conduct SO (Office of the Chairman, Joint 
Pub. 3-05, 1992, p. GL-20). This thesis focuses on Army SOF, specifically 
Special Forces (SF), Rangers, and Special Mission Units (SMUs). 
There are three weaknesses in current JTMD doctrine. First, the 
doctrine has been under development or revision for over four years. Because 
of the lack of guidance and the changing nature of the JTMD doctrine, the 
separate Military Services have concentrated on their own separate theater 
missile defense (fMD) missions. Second, each Service's concentration on its 
own TMD mission has hindered the development of Joint Tactics, Techniques, 
and Procedures (JTTPs) for attack operations against TMs. Joint tactics, 
techniques, and procedures are actions and methods which implement joint 
doctrine and describe how forces will be employed in joint operations (Office 
of the Chariman, Joint Pub. 1-02, 1994, p. 207). Third, the lack of JTTPs for 
attack operations against TMs has prevented the successful integration of SOFs 
unique capabilities into attack operations against TMs.16 This weakness is 
16Attack operations are not missions in themselves, but a way of characterizing offensive strikes against launch 
platforms and their supporting infrastructure, including logistics (Office of the Chairman, Joint Pub 3-01.5, 1994, 
p. IIl-12). Strike operations are attacks intended to inflict damage on, seize, or destroy an object. Counterforce 
operations employ strategic air and missile forces in an effort to destroy, or render impotent, selected military 
capabilities of an enemy force (Office of the Chairman, Joint Pub 1-02, 1004, p. 114 and 96). Academic literature 
defines counterforce operations against TMs as operations that attack TMs before they are launched from TELs 
or silos or while they still are in stockpiles. (Lennox, 1991, p. 302) 
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critical. Some form of "eyes on target" may be needed at one or more phases 
of an attack operation to ensure success in destroying TMs aimed at politically 
sensitive or militarily significant targets. Today, Special Operations Forces can 
provide those eyes. 
E. A BEITER SOLUTION 
The development of improved JTMD doctrine and the integration of SOF 
into that doctrine and the JTTPs that implement it can enhance JTMD attack 
operations capabilities. This, in tum, enhances overall JTMD capabilities. 
Prior to a strike, SOF can assist in the detection, identification, and acquisition 
of the TM, its TEL, or supporting infrastructure. If necessary, SOF can assist 
in the strike using terminal guidance or beacon capabilities. If immediate 
confirmation of destruction of a TM site is critical, SOF can conduct post-strike 
reconnaissance and determine the extent of battle damage to the TM target. 
If necessary, SOF can assist in coordinating follow on strikes.17 Finally, if 
recovery of missile components from the TM site is critical for military, 
intelligence, environmental, or political purposes, SO F can perform this mission 
as well.18 
Special operations forces involvement in operations against TMs will 
normally be deep inside enemy controlled territory. Special operations forces 
17For information on SOF Special reconnaissance (SR) mission capabilities see Office of the Chairman, Joint 
Pub 3-05, 1992, p. 11-8. 
18For information on SOF Direct Action(DA) mission capabilities seeOffice of the Chairman, Joint Pub 3-05, 
1992, p. 11-5. 
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operate beyond the range of conventional ground force reconnaissance and 
strike capabilities (Office of the Chairman, Joint Pub 3-05, 1992, pp. II-5 and II-
7). To be effective, deep penetration SO against TMs may require additional 
joint service capabilities. Joint service operations have more difficult command, 
control, and communication issues. These issues go right to the heart of 
current JTMD doctrine issues. To eliminate these difficult joint issues, effective 
JTTPs must be developed, tested, and implemented. 
Single service operations are much simpler and easier to execute. 
Exercise Roving Sands 95 demonstrated that if attack operations against TMs 
fall within an Army Corp's area of interest, it is a single service operation under 
one commander with a short, effective target mission decision-making cycle. 19 
During Roving Sands 95, SO F reconnaissance elements identified numerous TM 
threats to an Army Corp Headquarters. The TMs were within range of the Corp 
weapon systems. The Corp Commander quickly engaged the TMs with his own 
strike assets. 20 
During the same exercise, other SOF reconnaissance elements located 
TMs for a Joint Headquarters. The Joint Headquarters did attack the TMs, 
however, their response time was significantly longer than that of the Corp 
1~he target mission cycle is the decision making process used by commanders to employ forces. It is a six 
step process. The steps are detection, identification, location (and tracking), decision, execution, and assessment 
(Office of the Chairman, Joint Pub 1-02, 1994, p. 245 parentheses added). 
20'fhe Apache attack helicopter and the Army tactical missile system (ATACMS) are the two weapons systems 
that a Corp Commander has under his command that would most likely be used in a strike operation against TMs. 
For additional information on these two weapons systems see Association of the U. S. Army, Army Green Book 
1995-96 Vol 45 No 10, October 1995, pp. 290 and 278 and Department of Defense, 1992, pp. 699 and 752. 
11 
Headquarters. It was longer because additional coordination, liaison officers 
(LNOs), and layers of command were involved in the operation. 
F. PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THIS STUDY 
This thesis examines the question: What is the role of SOF in operations 
against TMs? Chapter II examines current and proposed JTMD doctrine. 
Current JTMD doctrine, and the four layers that compose it are identified. The 
impact that attack operations, one layer of current JTMD doctrine, have on the 
other elements of JTMD is examined. Three reasons why current JTMD 
doctrine is unable to defend against TMs are discussed. Ongoing attempts to 
improve JTMD doctrine are identified. Finally, the possibility of improving 
JTMD attack operations by incorporating Navy anti-submarine warfare (ASW) 
philosophy into JTMD doctrine is examined. 
Chapter ID identifies the TM problem. It examines four external factors 
which prevent current JTMD doctrine from effectively defending against TMs. 
First, TM political impact verses TM military significance is addressed. Second, 
TM characteristics and employment techniques are discussed. Third, the 
proliferation of TMs is addressed. Finally, the issue of TMs and WMDs is 
examined. 
Chapter IV examines Allied attempts to destroy and disrupt German V 
weapon attacks during World War II. It is an Allied attempt to destroy or 
disrupt TMs armed with conventional weapons. Chapter V examines U.S. led 
Coalition attempts to stop Iraqi SCUDs from striking Israel during the Persian 
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Gulf War. This case includes SOF involvement in operations against TMs 
armed with conventional weapons, their TELs, and infrastructure. Chapter VI 
examines Air Force planning efforts to destroy Soviet nuclear missiles in 
Cuban during the Cuban Missile Crisis. This case incorporates the problems 
involved when TMs are armed with WMDs. All three cases demonstrate the 
difficulty in destroying TMs without some form of 'eyes on target' at one or 
more phases of an attack operation. 
Chapter VII examines a recent multi-service theater missile defense 
(fMD) exercise called Roving Sands 95. It was the first attempt by the Army 
and Air Force to test their individual service TMD capabilities. Chapter VIII 
offers an assessment of the case studies. United States military doctrinal 
weaknesses and strengths are examined. The TM problem is discussed. The 
benefits and limitations of JTMD doctrine are discussed along with the unique 
capabilities that SOF can bring to JTMD operations. This thesis supports the 
development of JTTPs that integrate SO F and enhance JTMD capabilities. 
Five assumptions underlie this thesis. First, it does not address U.S. 
policy concerns involved in authorizing an attack operation against an 
identified TM threat to U.S. forces or national interests. Such an attack 
operation may or may not be preemptive. The specific circumstances of the TM 
threat and whether the United States and the potential aggressor state are 
involved in peacetime competition, conflict, or war will determine if an 
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operation is preemptive.21 The U.S. military must plan for a worst case 
scenario and be prepared to execute an attack operation against hostile TMs if 
ordered by the NCA. 
Second, intelligence issues, requirements and shortfalls are not 
addressed. This thesis assumes that accurate and reliable intelligence will exist 
and enable the execution of attack operations with a high probability of 
success. The development of JTTPs for attack operations against TMs will help 
define the intelligence requirements for these operations to be successful. 
Without accurate and reliable intelligence, an attack operation cannot be 
executed. 
Third, the use of nuclear weapons by the U.S. against hostile TMs is not 
considered. Joint theater missile defense doctrine addresses only non-nuclear 
responses.22 Policy concerns involved in the preemptive or retaliatory use of 
nuclear weapons involve different strategic and policy considerations. Non-
nuclear options must be adequately addressed before nuclear options are 
considered. 
Fourth, the issue that using force, even non-nuclear force, against 
another state's nuclear weapons capabilities, and other WMD capabilities by 
21The terms peacetime competition, conflict, and war are used in the National Security Strategy of Engagement 
and Enlargement. These terms are not specifically defined there. The DOD definitions for these terms appear 
to be similar and are used in this thesis. Peacetime (competition) is the period when the U.S. influences world 
events through actions that routinely occur between states. Conflict is a period characterized by confrontation 
and the need to engage in hostilities other than to secure strategic objectives. War is a state of open and declared 
armed conflict between states. War can be limited or general. (Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 100-5 
Operations, 1993, pp. GL-7, GL-2, and GL-9) 
22For information on nuclear options for targeting mobile missiles see Westbrook, K. L., U.S. Options for 
Targeting Soviet ICBMs, (Newport: Naval War College, 1990), pp. 3-12 and Schneider and Fink, 1991, pp. 12-14. 
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extension, can be viewed by the targeted state as the initiation of nuclear war 
by the United States.23 This U.S. policy consideration must be examined based 
on the particular circumstances surrounding the potential conflict. 
Finally, JTMD doctrine is oriented to defend against other states that 
have, are developing, or will develop TM capabilities. This thesis does not 
consider transnational threats or substate groups as potential TM threats.24 
These definitions overlap and are often used interchangeably. The term 
substate group will be used in this thesis. To date, there is not yet an effective 
defense against the employment of conventional weapons and WMDs by 
substate groups. An example of unconventional aerial employment by a 
substate group is the use of small manned or unmanned aerial vehicle to 
carrying conventional high explosives or WMDs to a target. An effective JTMD 
capability can defend against TMs. A JTMD capability could provide some 
marginal protection against unconventional aerial employment where none 
exists today. 
23For information on this issue see Wirtz, James J., Counterproliferation, Counterforce, and Nuclear War, pp. 
10-12, Naval Postgraduate School, 12 March, 1995. 
24'fransnational threats spread beyond state borders and combating them generally relies beyond the reach 
of any single state government. Terrorism is an example of a transnational phenomenon. (Office of the Chairman, 
The National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 1995, p. 31) Substate groups are defined as 
movements or organizations that consider themselves outside the domain of any state. They can also spread 
across state borders. A terrorist organization is an example of a substate group. (Dror, 1980, p. 30) 
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II .. THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE 
The President is responsible for the development of the National Security 
Strategy. The National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement 
advances the President's perception of the U.S. international role. It also 
presents the President's strategy to fulfill that role and advance U.S. interests 
abroad. 
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is responsible for developing 
the National Military Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement. The 
National Military Strategy is developed from the President's National Security 
Strategy. The National Military Strategy identifies regional instability and 
WMDs as two of the four principal dangers that our military must address. 
Overseas presence and power projection are strategic concepts that support this 
strategy. The requirement for strong alliances is also an important component 
of the strategy. (Office of the Chairman, The National Military Strategy of the 
United States, 1995, pp. i, 2, 6, 7, and 10) 
The proliferation of TMs represents a significant challenge to U.S. 
security. Whether armed with conventional warheads or WMDs, TMs can 
threaten regional stability. Theater missiles can be a threat to American and 
Al.lied forces overseas. Theater missiles can be used to target civilian 
populations. Endangering Al.lies' cities with TMs can weaken or destroy 
alliances that are critical to U.S. national security. 
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The Report to Congress on Nonproliferation and Counterproliferation 
Activities and Programs identifies prompt mobile target kill capabilities as a 
counterproliferation area needing improvement. The report also says that 
prompt mobile target kills are an adequately funded area (Office of the Deputy 
Secretary of Defense, 1994, p. ES-2). Despite adequate funding for future 
requirements, new TM attack and defense systems are years away from 
fielding.25 Meanwhile, the Persian Gulf War demonstrated thatthe U.S. military 
and our allies are vulnerable to TMs now.26 
A. CURRENT JOINT THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE DOCTRINE 
Theater missiles can appear across the entire military environment. The 
threat can span military operations other than war (M OOTW) through mid- and 
high-intensity conflicts/wars. Because the scope of the threat is so large, the 
doctrine to defend against it must be comprehensive. 
Current JTMD doctrine is composed of four operational elements. These 
elements are interconnected defenses that, together, have the potential to form 
an effective missile defense. The elements or layers are: passive defense; active 
defense; attack operations; and command, control, communication, computers, 
and intelligence (C4I). Passive defense includes individual and unit defensive 
25For information on USAF attack operations and active defense initiatives see Snodgrass, 1993, pp. 21-36 and 
43-63. For information on the Army Theater High Altitude Area Defense (fHAAD) system see Association of the 
U. S. Army, October 1995, p . 238. For information on the equivalent Navy Aegis Vertical Launch System also 
known as the Endo- and Extro-atmospheric Intercepter see Yarymovych, 1995, pp. 3-4. 
ZSSee Miller, 1992, p. A-24; Powell, April 1992, pp. 48-53: Powell, October 1992, pp. 32-35; and Schneider 
and Fink, 1991, pp. 12-13. 
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measures, also called collective measures, to reduce the effects of a TM attack. 
Active defense includes measures to intercept, destroy, or negate the effects of 
TMs in flight after launch. Attack operations are actions to neutralize, destroy, 
and/or negate an adversary's ability to produce, deploy, and employ TMs before 
launch. The responsibility of C4I is to allow the joint/combined commander to 
synergistically coordinate and integrate the other three JTMD capabilities 
across all military forces, both joint and combined, within a theater. (Office of 
the Chairman, Joint Pub 3-01.5, 1994, p. iv) 
I. Passive Defense 
Passive defensive measures provide individual and collective protection 
for friendly forces, population centers, and critical assets. Principal passive 
defensive measures include tactical warning, reducing targeting effectiveness, 
reducing vulnerability, recovery, and C4I. Tactical warning is important 
because it triggers other passive defensive actions, both civilian and military. 
(Office of the Chairman, Joint Pub 3-01.5, 1994, pp. ill-4 and ill-5) 
2. Active Defense 
Active defense consists of a defense in depth against TMs during their 
entire flight profile when TM destruction prior to launch was not possible or 
not successful. Active defensive measures include multiple engagement 
opportunities with different systems to increase the chances of successful 
interception. Multiple defense and interdiction systems, Patriot, THAAD, etc., 
decrease the possibility that an enemy can successfully counter our active 
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defense capabilities. Active defense capabilities include boost phase intercept, 
mid-course intercept, and terminal phase intercept. (Office of the Chairman, 
Joint Pub 3-01.5, 1994, pp. ill-8 and ill-9) 
Boost phase intercept requires destruction of the incoming missile 
immediately after launch. It requires the integration of near-real-time strategic 
and operational launch intelligence capabilities with the immediate targeting 
and delivery of destructive capabilities. Rapid damage assessment is also 
required to determine if additional engagements of the same target are required 
(Office of the Chairman, Joint Pub 3-01.5, 1994, p. ill-8 and ill-9). This 
capability does not yet exist. 27 
Mid-course intercept is the second level of active defense. It allows 
additional time for the integration of near-real-time launch information, target 
identification and tracking, and extra-atmospheric interception (Office of the 
Chairman, Joint Pub 3-01.5, 1994, p. ill-9). This capability also does not exist.28 
Boost phase and mid-course interception provide the best opportunities 
to intercept TMs after launch and limit collateral damage to friendly facilities 
and populations. Mid-course intercept allows a second opportunity to engage 
TMs. Limiting collateral damage is especially important if there is a possibility 
that TMs are armed with WMDs. When these capabilities are developed, they 
will significantly enhance JTMD capabilities. 
27For information see Snodgrass, 1992, pp. 26-35. 
28For information see Olson, 1991, pp. 5-10. 
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Terminal phase interception involves intercepting a TM after reentry into 
the atmosphere in its final phase of trajectory. Interception is primarily by 
surface-to-air missile (Office of the Chairman, Joint Pub 3-01.5, 1994, p. III-9). 
Although the Patriot was not originally designed for TM defense, it was 
modified. The new Patriot PAC-3 system is currently the only mobile anti-
missile system in the world. Despite initial reports, the effectiveness of the 
system and its recent improvements has yet to be determined. 
3. Attack Operations 
Attack operations are characterized by offensive actions intended to 
destroy and disrupt enemy TM capabilities before, during, and after launch. 
The object is to prevent TM launches by attacking each element in the TM 
target system.29 The preferred method is to attack and destroy TMs prior to 
launch. Attack operations also attempt to deny or disrupt the employment of 
additional TMs that may be available to the enemy. Attack operations are not 
isolated missions. They are operations that involve the execution of mutually 
supporting and synergistic tasks across all operational elements against TMs 
and their launch platforms, supporting infrastructure, and logistics (Office of 
the Chairman, Joint Pub 3-01.5, 1994, III-13). The overall political and military 
circumstances surrounding a potential conflict will determine if prelaunch 
?SA target system is a group of interrelated targets where the destruction of a target system component or 
critical node will destroy or degrade the capabilities of the entire system. A target system component consists of 
one or more basic elements required for a target weapon system to function. Components can include 
manufacturing, transportation, support infrastructure, etc .. (Office of the Chairman, Joint Pub. 1-02, 1192, pp. 378-
381). A TM weapon system is an example of a target system. Its components would include the manufacturing 
facilities; communication networks; transportation means, i.e., modified rail or truck carriers, etc.; missile storage 
and supply facilities; presurveyed launch facilities; and TEL hide sites. See also, Footnote 31. 
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strikes are possible. The issue of preemptive attacks is not considered in this 
paper, only the requirement that the military must be able conduct them if 
ordered. 
Current JTMD doctrine emphasizes passive defense, active defense, and 
C4I. There have been limited efforts devoted to attack operations by 
conventional precision guided munitions. Efforts to improve attack operations 
are centered on technological improvements in precision guided munitions and 
aerial assets. Yet, immediate improvements in attack operations can be 
achieved by integrating SO F and their capabilities into attack operations against 
TMs. 
Successful attack operations require rapid detection, identification, 
acquisition, and the application of firepower on target before a TM is launched. 
Because prelaunch intercept has never been accomplished, preventing the 
launch of additional missiles by the same TEL has been selected as the next 
best measure of success. 
4. Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and 
Intelligence 
Command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) 
is an integrated system that includes doctrine, procedures, organizational 
structures, facilities, communications, and supporting intelligence. It includes 
missile warning and cuing of defensive systems by missile warning sensors. It 
provides commanders at all levels the timely and accurate data and to plan, 
monitor, direct, control, and report TM operations (Office of the Chairman, 
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Joint Pub 3-01.5, 1994, p. I-4). Command, control, communication, computers, 
and intelligence allows the military commander to synergistically coordinate 
and integrate all of the military forces and their combat power in a theater. 
B. ATTACK OPERATIONS AND JOINT THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE 
Attack operations are the most critical element of JTMD. The success 
or failure of attack operations contributes directly to the success or failure of 
the second most critical element of JTMD, active defense. To understand the 
interdependence of these two elements, two concepts must be understood: "the 
Theater Missile Transporter-Erector-Launcher Cycle" and "the Flaming Datum 
Approach.1130 (Conner, Ehlers, and Marshall, 1993, p. 6) 
1. The Theater Missile Transporter-Erector-Launcher Cycle 
While the TM actually causes death and destruction, the TEL is the 
critical damage point or critical node of the TM system.31 Without TELs, TMs 
cannot be launched. The TM TEL Cycle describes the employment cycle of the 
TEL from its secure base facility, to its forward staging area, to its launch site, 
and back again. 
During peacetime, TELs spend a significant amount of time at centralized 
base facilities or in storage. By consolidating TM assets at centralized 
3
°For additional information, also see, Hair, T.W., The Application of Search Theory to the Timely Location of 
Tactical Ballistic Missiles, Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, March 1993. 
31The target critical damage point or critical node is the point of a target component that is most vital. (Office 
of the Chairman, Joint Pub. 1-02, 1994, p. 379) See also, Footnote 29. 
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locations, their security and maintenance is improved. Periodically, the TEL 
units will deploy into the field to conduct proficiency training. They return to 
the centralized facility for security and routine maintenance operations. 
(Conner, Ehlers, and Marshall, 1993, p. 6) 
During crises, the TELs deploy from their centralized facilities. The 
TELs move into smaller forward operating bases. These bases still provide a 
reasonable level of physical security, maintenance and support for the TELs. 
By increasing the number of secure forward operating bases, a state increases 
its security against preemptive attacks. At the same time, a state can still 
maintain the capability to command, control, maintain, and service the TELs. 
Movement to the forward operating bases is the first step of the TM TEL 
circulation model. (Conner, Ehlers, and Marshall, 1993, p. 6) 
Should tensions continue to rise, the TELs would be ordered to move into 
launch positions at the first sign of hostilities. The dispersal of the TELs is an 
effective defense against preemptive strikes. Dispersing TELs to their launch 
positions is the second step of the TM TEL circulation model. Once a TEL has 
launched its missile, it normally must return to the forward operating base to 
load another missile, and begin the cycle again. 32 This final step completes one 
32-J'hree other means of employing TELs include augmenting a TEL with an additional missile(s), positioning 
additional missiles at alternate launch points to wait the TELs arrival, or have a transporter meet a TEL and 
transload missiles. These techniques require at least one vehicle large enough to transport and transload 
additional missiles. The hinderance in employing TMs has been the limited number of TELs available, not the 
number of missiles. Since World War II, no state has used its resources to develop only a transporter when it 
could produce a TEL with only a minor increase in resources and effort. Additionally, these techniques increase 
the amount of vehicle traffic in and near the launch area. This increased signature reduces the survivability of 
the TELs and missiles. 
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Figure 1. TM TEL Circulation 
Model (Conner, Ehlers, and 
Marshall, 1993, p. 7) 
T~~ major limitation in the TM TEL circulation model is how long a TEL 
and its crew can remain deployed and operational without outside resupply or 
maintenance. Once resupply or maintenance is necessary, the TEL becomes 
more vulnerable. It must move to the forward staging area, or supplies and/or 
a maintenance crew must travel to it. This additional traffic endangers the TEL 
and its crew. 
2. The Flaming Datum Approach to Attack Operations.Against 
Theater Missiles 
The post-launch interdiction of TELs prevents them from rearming and 
launching additional TMs. This approach has been described as "the flaming 
datum approach" (Conner, Ehlers, and Marshall, 1993, p. 3). This tactic is part 
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of the Air Force's emphasis on conducting attritional attack operations against 
TELs after launch, rather than dedicating significant assets to conduct pre-
launch attack operations.33 This approach depends on two capabilities, the 
capability to rapidly destroy the TELs after launch. The second is the capability 
to conduct a successful in depth, multi-layered defense that destroys the TMs 
after launch.34 Neither capability presently exists.35 
To destroy a TEL after launch, the flaming datum approach emphasizes 
using national and theater intelligence collection assets to cue off the 
tremendous TM launch signature. Then there are three possible means of 
striking the TELs. First, dedicated air assets on station in the suspected TEL 
launch area are immediately directed into the TEL target area. Second, 
dedicated air assets on strip alert are launched into the TEL target area. 
Finally, any aircraft in or near the TEL target area on any other ~ssion is 
diverted to locate and attack the TEL. All these tactics were tried without 
success during the Persian Gulf War. 
To destroy a TM after launch, a multi-layered defense capability must 
exist. The technology necessary to field an integrated multi-layered active 
defense does not yet exist. Neither the Army's Patriot Advanced Capability-3 
(PAC-3) nor the Theater High-Altitude Area Defense (fHAAD) system is 
33Based on experience in the Cold War attempting to locate and destroy mobile Soviet ICBM missiles, the 
Central Command Air Force (CENT AF) chose to concentrate on interdicting the SCUD missile infrastructure not 
individual launchers. (Keaney and Cohen, 1993, p. 43) 
34For additional information see Snodgrass, 1992, pp. 28-36. 
35For additional information see Olson, 1991, p. 5-10; Glashow, J., "Hite Pushes Army Priorities," Army Times, 
4 September, 1995, p. 24; and Association of the United States Army, 1995, pp. 238 and 290. 
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operational. The Navy's Aegis system is not operational. The Air Force's 
Boost Phase Intercept concept is still in its developmental phases. 
3. The Impact of Attack Operations on Joint Theater Missile 
Defense 
This thesis defines an attack operation as successful if it destroys a 
TEL before it can launch its TM. This success has two parts. First, the 
attack absolutely prevents a missile from being launched at U.S. or 
Coalition assets. Second, the destruction of the TEL also reduces the 
number of possible missiles that could be launched by that TEL in the 
future. 
A partial success occurs if a TEL is destroyed after it launches its TM. 
It is a partial victory because the destruction of the TEL reduces the number 
of possible missiles that the destroyed TEL could have launched in the 
future. Destruction of the TEL after its missile is launched is a partial 
failure because the active defense assets may or may intercept and destroy 
the TM. 
Every missile destroyed before launch prevents casualties and reduces 
the amount of destruction to U.S. and Coalition assets. It also reduces the 
number of inbound missiles that active missile defense assets must defend 
against. If the TEL is destroyed after it has launched its TM, the active 
missile defenses must still intercept the inbound TM. They will not have to 
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intercept additional missiles that could have been launched from the 
destroyed TEL in the future. 
C. RETIDNKING JOINT THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE DOCTRINE 
Current JTMD doctrine emphasizes attritional warfare. This type of 
warfare is effective if the war lasts a long time and one side can afford to 
wear the other side down. Recent conflicts, however, have demonstrated the 
limited effectiveness of attrition and the lack of time to cany it out. The 
nature of warfare has changed in two important ways. First, the U.S., its 
Allies, and enemies now prepare to fight and win wars quickly and 
decisively. As Vietnam demonstrated, modern warfare has become too 
costly to prolong purposely. Second, WMDs change the calculations of 
interests and costs of modern warfare (The White House, 1995, p. 13). 
States can no longer allow themselves to be vulnerable to weapons capable 
of delivering WMDs. The implications of these two changes indicate current 
JTMD doctrine is not suited for the problem of TMs armed with WMDs. 
Two case studies in Chapters IV and V demonstrate it is ineffective to waste 
air assets conducting a strategic bombing campaign against an enemy's TM 
factories, storage facilities, and logistics facilities when the enemy's TMs and 
TELs have already moved into individual launch sites and are aimed at U.S. 
forces and/or national interests. 
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D. IMPROVING JOINT TIIEATER l\1ISSILE DEFENSE CAPABILITIES 
There are three separate players in the joint doctrine development 
process. These players are the military services, the theater CINCs, and 
USSOCOM. 
1. The Military Services 
Currently, the Joint Staff designates individual services to lead the 
development of joint doctrine. This method of developing joint doctrine has 
produced "a compendium of competing and sometimes incompatible 
concepts" (Department of Defense, Commission on the Roles and Missions 
of the Armed Forces, 1995, pp. 2-3). The main weakness in the process is 
the possibility that an individual service will put its own interests over the 
interests of the U. S. military. 
2. The Theater Commanders in Chief 
The Goldwater-Nichols Act strengthens the role of the theater CINCs 
in the joint doctrinal development process. Theater CINCs are the nation's 
war fighters. Before the act, the military services developed the doctrine, 
tactics, training, weapons, and equipment used by the CINCs. The CINCs 
had little if any input. They were expected to follow the different services' 
doctrine whether it applied to combat in their individual theaters. 
Each theater CINC is responsible for developing their theater's 
strategic concept. The strategic concept is the CINC's course of action 
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(COA) and is based on his estimate of the strategic situation. The concept 
must be flexible enough to permit its use in framing the military, diplomatic, 
economic, psychological, and other measures (Office of the Chairman, Joint 
Pub. 1-02, p.363). From the strategic concept, operations plans (OPLANS) 
are developed. They are plans for the conduct of joint operations. They can 
be used as a basis for developing a complete operations order (OPORD). 
Operation plans identify the forces and supplies required to execute the 
CINC's strategic concept. It also includes a movement schedule of those 
resources to the theater of operations. A contingency plan (CONPLAN) is 
an abbreviated OPLAN. It requires considerable expansion or alteration to 
convert it to an OPORD. 
Today, the different theater CINCs develop their strategic concepts, 
OPORDs, OPLANs, and CONPLANs based on existing doctrine and their 
own theater requirements. After review by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, if current doctrine, tactics, or forces do not support the 
implementation of the CINC's strategy, the services must prepare, train, and 
equip the forces necessary to support the CINCs. 
3. The United States Special Operations Command 
The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) was 
created within the Department of Defense 11 in response to deep-rooted 
Congressional concerns" regarding the capability of the different services' to 
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prepare SOF and conduct SO (United States Special Operations Command, 
1988, p. Intro-5). The United States Special Operations Command is unique. 
It was the first truly integrated and joint command and combined all 
continental SOF units from the Army, Navy, and Air Force under its 
command. 
For USSOCOM and its units to maintain a high degree of autonomy 
from their parent services, they were given their own budget authority. This 
was necessary because different service SOF unit funding requirements 
were significantly different from their parent service requirements. This 
difference resulted in SOF and SO capabilities being consistently under-
funded. Along with the funding authority came the requirement for 
USSOCOM to develop all SOF strategy, doctrine, tactics, training, 
equipment, and weapons requirements. These are functions that the 
military services normally perform. 
Besides its service-like responsibilities, USSOCOM was directed by 
the Secretary of Defense to take the lead in developing SOF 
counterproliferation (CP) doctrine (Secretary of Defense Memorandum, 5 
May 1995). Special operations force operations against TMs should fall 
under this CP directive. This requirement should force USSOCOM to 




E. TIIE DEVELOPMENT OF JOINT THEATER l\flSSil.E DEFENSE 
DOC1RINE 
The joint publication for JTMD was first published in 1994. The Army 
was tasked by the Joint Staff to be the lead Service in developing this 
doctrine. The Army did a decent job in developing current JTMD doctrine 
from scratch. Next, the Joint Staff tasked the Air Force with improving on 
current JTMD doctrine. The Air Force submitted a draft proposal to change 
JTMD doctrine and make it a subset of counter-air operations (Department 
of the Army Memorandum, 14 July 1995, p. 1). Counter-air operations are 
operations dominated by the Air Force. Upon reviewing the Air Force's 
proposed changes to current JTMD doctrine, the Army advised the Air Force 
that their proposed doctrine was flawed and "does not conform to current 
joint doctrine as established in Joint Publications 3-0 and 3-1.5.3." The Army 
did agree that there were areas where theater counter-air doctrine and 
JTMD doctrine overlapped. The two doctrines, however, were separate and 
distinct from each other (Department of the Army Memorandum, 14 July 
1995, p. 1). This is an unfortunate example of the doctrinal development 
processes described by the Commission on the Roles and Missions of the 
Armed Forces. 
Some elements of existing joint doctrine and JTTPs fit directly into 
existing JTMD doctrine. Two examples are laser target designation (LTD) 
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and radar beacon operations.36 These two SOF capabilities represent only 
a small portion of the capability that SOF can bring to operations against 
TMs. The current disagreement between the Army and Air Force over 
JTMD doctrine has delayed further development and implementation of 
additional ITMD JTTPs. This delay also interferes with USSOCOM's efforts 
to integrate SOF capabilities with conventional force capabilities. These 
delays continue to leave the United States unable to effectively defend 
against TM attacks. 
F. TIIEATER l\flSSILES AND ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE 
An unorganized and uncoordinated search operation for either a TM 
TEL located somewhere within a country, or a submarine located 
somewhere at sea, has been characterized as 'looking for a needle in a field 
of haystacks.' This helps explain why the U.S. military's poorly organized 
and coordinated efforts to locate TM TELs has never been effective. 
Professors and researchers at the Na val Postgraduate School have 
compared the target acquisition and destruction of TM TELs to the Navy's 
doctrine of anti-submarine warfare (ASW). Submarine and TM TEL 
operations are similar. Operations to destroy both have similarities (Wirtz, 
1995, pp. 4-7). Both weapon systems require an extensive support 
36Foradditional information on laser target designation operations, see Joint Pub. 3-09.1, Joint Laser Designation 
Procedures, U.S. Government Print Office, 1991. For information on radar beacon operations, see Joint Pub. 3-
09.2, J1TP for Radar Beacon Operations (J-Beacon), U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993. 
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infrastructure, beginning with the necessary research, development, and 
testing facilities and continuing through the manufacturing and fielding of 
the two weapon systems. Both weapons require high degrees of complex 
maintenance and tight security precautions. Due to of these requirements, 
both weapon systems are concentrated at a few secure bases or ports when 
not deployed for training or alert. Both weapons regularly depart from their 
bases or ports for training. Both move into their operational areas, train, 
and then return to their base or port. Finally, if properly organized and 
trained, the United States has the national and theater intelligence 
capabilities to track and destroy both weapons. 
The Navy's ASW operations have two immediate advantages over 
JTMD operations. First, ASW operations are strictly Navy operations and 
no other services are involved. While air, surface, and subsurface forces are 
involved, they are all Navy forces that are organized and trained together. 
Second, ASW operations are conducted in international waters. The initial 
stages of operations could be accomplished without violating an aggressor 
state's territorial boundaries. At some point, those boundaries must be 
violated and a state's air defenses become a threat as well. 
There are five phases to ASW doctrine. Phase One is "the continuous 
collection and analysis of intelligence on all known platforms." Phase Two 
is the "continuous monitoring of all probable launch areas." Phase Three is 
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the "generation of cuing (warning) when specific platforms move to a launch 
status." 
STEP ONE 
STRIKING AND DESTROYING THE 
TARGET 
STEP TWO 
LOCALIZATION OF SPECIFIC TMs 
STEP THREE 
DEVELOPING WARNING INDICATORS TO INDICATE 
WHEN TMs MOVE TO A POSSIBLE LAUNCH STATUS 
(REFERRED TO AS CUING) 
STEP FOUR 
CONTINUOUS MONITORING OF ALL POSSIBLE LAUNCH AREAS 
STEP FIVE 
CONTINUOUS COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS ON ALL KNOWN PLATFORMS 
Figure 2. The Five-Step ASW Pyramid 
Phase Four is "the localization of specific systems." Phase Five is "attack." 
(Wirtz, 1995, pp. 4-5) 
Employing ASW doctrine resembles a pyramid. Completing each 
phase of the ASW doctrine pyramid builds on the success of the other 
phases and brings the operation one step closer to success, the destruction 
of the target. Figure 2 shows the five-step pyramid. 
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Success at the first step reduces the area that intelligence collection 
assets must cover. This process of focusing intelligence assets on smaller 
target areas increases the probability of success up through the other steps 
of the pyramid. (Wirtz, 1995, p. 5) 
Step One identifies a potential aggressor's capabilities. It indicates the 
type, characteristics, and numbers of an aggressor's TMs. Success in this 
step narrows down the size of an aggressor state's potential TM operating 
area. This allows U.S. intelligence assets to be more effectively employed 
and concentrate on suspected or known TM training and operational areas 
in Step Two (Wirtz, 1995, pp. 5-6). These first two steps require gathering 
large amounts of information and intelligence from all states that develop, 
produce, or acquire TMs, including friendly states. This is necessary 
because even the U.S. and other friendly states sell arms to other states that 
have the potential to become aggressor states (i.e., Iraq). 
Cuing, the third step, begins the intensive process of tracking each 
potential TM. The NCA or the theater CINCs would determine what 
potentially aggressive states this resource intensive and methodical process 
would be focused on. Additionally, if tensions in a particular theater began 
to rise, additional resources could be added to enable that CINC to 
effectively monitor the TM situation. 
Step Four, localizing, would require a significant and noticeable 
increase in military and intelligence collection activities. To be successful, 
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overllights of another state's territory might be required. The NCA would 
normally be closely monitoring any situation where the tensions had risen 
to such a degree that this step was required.37 
Step Five is the actual strike. The theater CINC, and his assigned 
forces, would be responsible for executing the actual attack operations. A 
closer examination of the Navy's ASW doctrine could help the development 
of .ITTPs that better integrate all the different Service capabilities and SO F's 
unique capabilities. 
3?'fhis thesis is only concerned with ensuring the military has the necessary capability to execute attack 
operations when and where ordered by the NCA. The NCA, not the military, determines what action, either 
military, diplomatic, or a combination of both, is necessary. 
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Ill. TIIE THEATER MISSILE PROBLEM 
There are four factors, outside the control of the U.S. military, which 
make up the TM problem. First, the political impact of TM strikes, usually 
against civilian populations, outweighs their military significance. Second, 
TM characteristics and employment techniques make them difficult weapons 
to defend against. Third, the widespread proliferation of TMs makes the 
problem more difficult to defend against. Finally, ifWMDs are inserted into 
the TM equation, mission success becomes important. The elimination of 
TMs armed with a WMD becomes virtually impossible without some form 
of "eyes on target." Failure could be catastrophic. 
A. POUTICAL IMPACT VERSUS MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE 
Theater missiles can produce a political impact beyond all proportion 
to their military effectiveness. The first V-1 attacks against the United 
Kingdom occurred on June 13, 1944 at Swanscombe: 
Within 10 weeks . . . over a million individuals moved to the 
country at their own expense in addition to the more than a 
quarter of a million who travelled free of charge under 
government schemes for voluntary withdrawal of school 
children and of younger children and their mothers. (Collier, 
1964, p. 12) 
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Political necessity then forces the military to divert assets from other targets 
of military value to solve the TM problem. This reallocation process has 
been implemented twice in conflicts involving the United States. The first 
occurred in World War II when the Allies were forced to reallocate air 
sorties and target German rocket launching sites: 
General Eisenhower diverted thirty percent of Allied bomber 
sorties away from targets inside Germany to attack V-1 launch 
sites. He did this while the battle for Normandy was still 
raging. (Snodgrass, 1993, p. 79) 
When strategic and tactical bombing raids proved ineffective at stopping the 
rockets, the Allies were forced to change the priority of the ground 
campaign against the Germans. One of Operation Market-Garden's goals 
was to capture V-2s along the Dutch coast. (Ryan, 1974, pp. 84-88) 
· The second example occurred during the recent Persian Gulf War. 
Again, political necessity forced the Coalition to divert air assets from high 
priority military missions to locating and destroying Iraqi modified SCUD 
missiles, their TELs, and infrastructure. The SCUDs were fired at Israel to 
force that country to retaliate against Iraq and cause the Coalition to split 
along Arab ethnic lines (Wirtz, 1995, p. 2). Some SOF elements also 
attempted to locate and assist in the destruction of the SCUDs. Lacking 
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previously established joint doctrine or JTTPs, the effectiveness of the 
separate efforts was minimal. 38 
B. DIFFICULTIES TARGETING MOBILE THEATER MISSilES 
As demonstrated in World War II, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the 
Persian Gulf War, the U.S. military has been unable to target or destroy TMs 
fired from fixed sites. 39 The United States was not successful defending 
against or attacking Iraq's SCUDs. The SCUDs were designed in 1962. Our 
military has no experience attacking newer, more accurate, and highly 
mobile TM.systems.40 
There are two groups of attributes that make TMs difficult to locate 
and destroy. Those attributes are TM characteristics and TM employment 
techniques. Theater missile characteristics include mobility, ease of 
concealment, and ease of maintenance and resupply. Theater missile 
employment techniques include the use of deception, decoys, dispersion, and 
using civilians as shields. When combined TM characteristics and 
:issee Miller, 1992, p. A-24; Powell, April 1992, pp. 48-53: Powell, October 1992, pp. 32-35; and Schneider and 
Fink, 1991, pp. 12-13. 
:&farget acquisition is the detection, identification, and tracking of a target in sufficient detail to permit the 
effective employment of weapons (Office of the Chairman, Joint Pub 1-02, 1994, p. 365). Detection is the process 
of perceiving a possibly military significant target (Office of the Chairman, Joint Pub 1-02, 1994, p. 115). 
Identification is discriminating between detected objects as friendly or enemy, or the name that belongs to a 
particular object as a member or a class of items. For example, identifying a object as an Iraqi TM (Office of the 
Chairman, Joint Pub 1-02, 1994, p. 177). Tracking is the precise and continuous position-finding of targets by 
radar, optical, or other means (Office of the Chairman, Joint Pub 1-02, 1994, p. 392). 
40\Vith the exception of German V-1 flying bombs and the Soviet SS-5 intermediate range ballistic missile 
(IRBM), mobility has been an important design feature in TM systems. Mobility enhances survivability. To 
improve the accuracy of older TM systems, TMs have been fired from fixed or presurveyed firing points. This was 
the case in the Persian Gulf War and in the Iran-Iraq War. 
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employment techniques make it difficult for the military to defend against 
TM attacks. 
1. Characteristics of Theater Missiles 
Three characteristics of TMs make them difficult to target and 
destroy: mobility; ease of concealment; and ease of maintenance and 
resupply. First, modem TMs are highly mobile. The mobility of TELs 
allows them to travel on average highways and traverse most bridges, 
tunnels, and underpasses. They can also be transported over regular 
railroad systems. This degree of flexibility significantly reduces a TM's 
signature. Add in a limited off road capability and attempting to gather 
intelligence, locate, target, and destroy TMs becomes significantly more 
difficult. 
Second, TMs are easy to conceal.41 Materials such as a portable 
camouflage net system can provide protection against most national and 
theater level intelligence collection assets. Another concealment technique 
used by Germany and Iraq was to hide their missiles or TELs in caves or 
tunnels. If intelligence and strike assets cannot locate TELs, they cannot be 
destroyed. 
41Camouflage involves the use of natural or manmade material on people, objects, or tactical positions to 
confuse, mislead, or evade and enemy. Concealment is protection from obseivation or suiveillance. (Office of the 
Chairman, Joint Pub 1-02, 1994, pp. 59 and 85.) Camouflage is one means of providing concealment. 
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Third, TMs have become easy to maintain and resupply. Modern 
TMs have become self-contained modular type systems. Missiles, similar in 
design to the Patriot or ATACMS, are now stored, transported and fired 
from sealed containers. If a missile is fired or just needs replacing, the 
modular container is removed and a new one put on. 
One way of tracking a TM is by its maintenance and logistics 
signature. This signature includes radio communications and personnel and 
vehicular movement. Reducing that signature increases the survivability of 
the individual TELs dramatically. However, modular systems are simple to 
resupply. They no longer need two or three different trucks to load the 
different fuel components into the rocket immediately prior to launch. The 
modernization of TMs significantly reduces the maintenance and logistics 
support. 
2. Employment Techniques of Theater Missiles 
Combining the use of deception, decoys, dispersal, and using civilians 
as shields makes locating, targeting, and destroying TMs difficult. If a 
potential aggressor state is good at using deception, it is extremely difficult 
to gather intelligence about that state's potential TM capabilities. Proper use 
of deception, combined with disinformation, can interfere or prevent U.S. 
intelligence analysts from determining the existence of TMs in a state, the 
capabilities of those TMs, or number of TELs and TMs. If a theater CINC 
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does not know or cannot rely on the accuracy of his critical intelligence, he 
cannot defend against TM threats. The Germans, the Iraqis, and, to a lesser 
extent, the Soviets all practiced good techniques of deception. 
The successful use of decoys depends directly on the success of a 
state's deception campaign. Decoys are easier and cheaper to build than 
real TELs and TMs. Decoys force the United States to waste intelligence 
and strike assets. Besides wasting limited strike assets, the personnel that 
will attack the decoys could be killed for no reason other than that our 
intelligence was not good enough. Lacking intelligence on a state's TM 
capability means that all potential TM targets, including inexpensive decoy 
TELs, will have to be eliminated. Meanwhile, real TELs located away from 
the decoys are launching real TMs at U.S. and Coalition assets. The use of 
deception and decoys can confuse intelligence and command capabilities. 
Decoys overextend strike capabilities and forces precious strike assets to be 
wasted on inexpensive decoys. 
Dispersing TELs, TMs, storage and maintenance facilities also 
· increases the intelligence assets necessary to gather information on a state's 
TM capabilities. It overextends and wastes valuable reconnaissance. More 
potential targets spread over a wider area means that more intelligence 
assets are required to locate concealed targets and make sure that they are 
not decoys. The military commander must then destroy those targets, which 
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can be spread over an entire country, before the missiles can launch or 
relocate. 
Positioning TMs near or within populated areas increases the risks of 
accidentally injuring noncombatants. Potential aggressor states know that 
the United States is more concerned about collateral damage than the 
potential aggressor is worried about its own people. This U.S. concern 
raises the political stakes for our political and military leaders when they 
consider conducting attack operations, especially possible preemptive 
operations, against TMs. 
The combination of these TM characteristics and methods of 
employment makes it difficult for U.S. planners to employ reconnaissance 
and strike assets to target and destroy TMs. With today's shrinking military, 
the virtually unlimited strike assets that were available to the military 
commanders during the Persian Gulf War are no longer available. 
C. 1HE PROLIFERATION OF TIIEATER MISSll.FS 
There are at least twenty-five emerging states that possess TMs.42 To 
date, TMs were used by four countries in three major interstate conflicts. 
The first significant use was by Germany in World War II. Iran and Iraq 
42"fhe countries are Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, 
Iran, Iraq, Israel, Kuwait, Libya, North Korea, South Korea, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Syria, Taiwan, 
Thailand, Vietnam, and Yemen (Fetter, 1991, p. 14). 
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used TMs in their 1980-1988 war. Iraq and the United States used TMs in 
the Persian Gulf Conflict.43 
Efforts to control the proliferation of missiles capable of carrying 
WMDs have slowed their spread. In 1987, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States established an informal 
agreement known as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). This 
informal arrangement is not a treaty and has no enforcement or compliance 
mechanisms. (Spector, McDonough, with Medeiros, 1995, p. 185) 
The MTCR was designed to prevent the spread of missiles capable of 
canying a payload of 500 kilograms to a range greater than 300 kilometers. 
This 500 kilogram weight was estimated as the minimum weight required 
for a basic nuclear warhead. This payload weight has since been amended 
to 300 kilograms. This new weight is designed to limit the potential use of 
a chemical or biological warheads on missiles. (Spector, McDonough, with 
Medeiros, 1995,p. 185) 
There are twenty-five members of the MTCR. Six other states are 
considered unilateral adherents to the regime. China claims to control 
missiles according to the original MTCR standards, however, China has been 
43Five other less significant uses of TMs have occurred. First during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Egypt and 
Syria attempted to launch, without effect, several missiles at Israeli troop concentrations. Second in 1986, Libya 
launched two SCUD missiles, without effect, at a U.S. LORAN facility on an island off the coast of Sicily. Third, 
the Soviet sponsored Communist government of Afghanistan used SCUD missiles against the Mujahideen in 1988-
89 (Carus, 1990, p. 1). Finally, since the end of the Persian Gulf War, the U.S. has launched cruise missiles at 
targets Iraq and Bosnian Serb controlled territory. These attacks continued through 1991. (O'Ballance, 1993, pp. 
180-183) 
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the subject of U.S. missile sanctions because of transfers of missile 
components. (Spector, McDonough, with Medeiros, 1995, pp. 185-186) 
D. THEATER MISSILES AND WEAPONS OF MASS DES1RUCTION 
The National Security Strategy identifies, as a critical requirement, the 
need to stem the proliferation of WMDs and their means of delivery (fhe 
White House, 1995, pp. 13-15). The proliferation of nuclear, chemical, 
biological, and radiological WMDs compounds the difficulties of targeting 
TMs possibly armed with WMDs. However, if it is in America's vital 
interest, we would be forced to take whatever actions necessary to ensure 
the destruction of WMD capable TMs:44 
We will do whatever it takes to defend these interests, including 
the unilateral and decisive use of military power. In all cases 
the cost and risks of U.S. military involvement must be 
commensurate with the stakes involved. (fhe White House, 
1995, p. 13) 
Strong action would be necessary, because the survival of the U.S. forces 
or Al.lies was at stake. The risk of failure, of an attack operation against a 
limited number of TMs possibly armed with WMDs that were being 
prepared for use against vital U.S. interests, is small when compared to the 
44
"America's vital interests are those of broad, overriding importance to the suivival, security, and vitality of 
our national entity - the defense of U.S. territoiy, citizens, allies, and economic well-being." (fhe White House, 
1995, p. 12) 
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outcome if those TMs were used. This section briefly examines the threat 
posed by each type of WMD. 
1. The Lethality of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Weapons of mass destruction are a status symbol and an instrument 
of political and military power (National Defense University, 1995, p. 116). 
Three factors must be considered when facing the threat posed by TMs 
armed with WMDs. The first is the level of destruction that the different 
types of WMDs can cause. The second is the degree of difficulty involved 
in developing, testing, and fielding the different types of WMDs. The third 
is the difficulty involved in detecting the presence of a WMD program in a 
state that is potentially hostile to the United States. States that wish to 
possess WMDs generally do not limit their research and development 
programs to just one type of WMD. Certain states are involved in multiple 
WMD acquisition programs. 
The most significant threat to U.S. vital interests overseas is a limited 
WMD strike delivered by either aircraft or TMs. Our vulnerability to aircraft 
delivered WMDs is low because our military has a highly developed counter-
air capability. Our vulnerability to TMs is high because current JTMD 
doctrine and capabilities are in their infancy. Because of the high order of 
destruction, suspected or potential nuclear proliferators already possessing 
TMs present the greatest threat to U.S. vital interests overseas. An effective 
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JTMD doctrine is needed to enhance the U.S. military's capability to defend 
against this threat. 
2. Nuclear Weapons of Mass Destruction 
While not the first WMD to be used, nuclear weapons were the first 
truly destructive weapons. Virtually everything at ground zero is destroyed. 
Because of the infrastructure needed to create nuclear weapons, they are the 
most difficult weapons for a state to produce. They are also the easiest 
WMD programs to detect. 
At least twenty countries have, or are seeking, the capability to deliver 
nuclear weapons (Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1995, p. 116). 
There are eight countries that have declared they possess nuclear weapons. 45 
Undeclared countries include India, Israel, and Pakistan. Iran, Libya, and 
North Korea have active or suspected nuclear weapon programs. It is 
believed that Iraq's nuclear weapons program has been dismantled. Iraq is 
subject to U.N. mandated long-term monitoring of its WMD programs 
(Spector, McDonough with Medeiros, 1995, p. 9). 
Five countries have voluntarily renounced or abandoned nuclear 
weapon programs and opened their nuclear facilities for international 
4.&J'hey are the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, China, France Russia, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States. Also included are the three Soviet successor states, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, that 
inherited them. 
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inspections. 46 Approximately eighteen industrialized countries have the 
potential to become nuclear proliferators but are abstaining from developing 
nuclear weapon programs. These countries possess the technical capability 
to produce nuclear weapons, have commercial nuclear power generation 
capability, and may also have significant quantities of weapons-usable 
nuclear material. Any of these states could join the nuclear club very 
quickly. 
3. Radiological Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Radiological weapons employ nuclear materials and/or radiation 
producing devices to create casualties or restrict the use of terrain/areas. 
They are terror weapons, not high order mass-casualty producing weapons 
like nuclear WMDs. Radiological WMDs are easy to produce and hard to 
detect. Threatening to use a radiological WMD on a neighboring country 
could have major psychological and economic impact.47 
Worldwide, there are over 531 commercial nuclear power generation 
facilities operating, under construction, or in the planning stages. Each 
year, over 4,000 kilograms of enriched commercial nuclear material is in 
46 These countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, 
Germany, Hungaxy, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Noiway, Poland, Slovakia, South Korea and Spain. (Spector, 
McDonough with Medeiros, 1995, p. 9). 
470ne hypothetical example of the use of a radiological WMD is the World Trade Center bombing. If a few 
pounds of radiological material had been added to the bomb, the impact would have been significantly greater. 
More deaths and a significant number of radiation sickness cases and a few deaths would have occurred. The 
economic impact would have been the difficulty in isolating and decontaminating the large area of downtown New 
York City surrounding the Trade Center. 
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continuous circulation among these facilities (Leventhal and Alexander, 
1986, pp. 56-65). With minor modifications, any state possessing nuclear 
material and TMs can develop TMs armed with radiological WMDs. 
4. Chemical Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Chemical weapons have the second lowest lethality capability of 
WMDs. If used properly, chemical protective equipment, clothing, and 
antidotes can defend against chemical agents. Chemical agents are easy to 
produce. As with nuclear weapons, the manufacturing infrastructure needed 
to develop chemical weapons is easy to detect. 
Most countries with facilities capable of producing pesticides or flame 
retardants can convert these facilities into chemical weapon's production in 
a matter of weeks or months. The globalization of the chemical trade, the 
availability of chemical know-how, and the availability of production 
equipment has given over 100 countries the capability to produce chemical 
weapons. (U.S. Office of Technical Assessment, 1993, p. 16) 
Like radiological WMDs, chemical WMDs are terror weapons rather 
than high order mass-casualty producing weapons.48 Even minimal 
protective equipment can significantly reduce casualties: 
48For information on chemical weapons see Bailey, K. C., Doomsday Weapons in the Hands of Many: The Arms 
Control Challenge of the 90's, University of Illinois Press, 1991. 
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On average, chemical weapons used in World War I produced 
from 1.6 to 5 times as many immediate casualties as a similar 
amount of high explosive weapons ... Averages are misleading, 
however, in that they tended to be driven up by high casualty 
rates incurred when gas was used against unprotected troops. 
Properly trained and protected troops took much lower 
casualties. (Clark, 1959, pp. 99-100) 
The rate of death per casualty was two to four times higher for fire wounds 
than chemical weapons (Clark, 1959, p. 1). A man wounded by gas had 
about twelve times the chance to live than a soldier suffering the effects of 
a traditional explosive wound (Waitt, 1942, p. 5). 
Iraq's threatened use of SCUD missiles filled with chemical agents 
against Israeli cities demonstrated that chemical weapons have a significant 
psychological impact. A successful prelaunch attack operation against those 
missiles would be the best defense. Extra-atmospheric interception would 
be the next best defense. The potential for chemical agents to rain down on 
a city exists if a TM is intercepted in the lower atmosphere by a Patriot type 
TMD system. 
5. Biological Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Biological weapons possess a combination of characteristics that make 
them one of the most effective WMDs. They produce a high order of 
casualties, second only to nuclear weapons. Like chemical WMDs, they are 
easy to produce, however, it is harder to detect a biological WMD program 
than it is other WMD programs. 
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Biological and toXin warfare involves the use of diseases and natural 
poisons to incapacitate or kill (U.S. Office of Technical Assessment, 1993, 
p. 71). They also can be targeted against livestock and domestic 
agriculture.49 Unlike radiological and chemical weapons, biological weapons 
are the true "the poor man's atomic bomb." A militarily significant quantity 
of a biological agent could be produced in a matter of days in a small, easily 
concealed, clandestine facility (U.S. Office of Technical Assessment, 1993, 
pp. 72-73). 
6. A Theater Missile Weapon of Mass Destruction Solution 
Army SOF units are better suited to deal with TMs than conventional 
military forces. Because of their specialized training and focus, SMUs are 
potentially the most qualified to deal with TMs armed with WMDs. These 
units have the highest probability of success in conducting attack operations 
against a limited number of TMs armed with WMDs.50 Even SMUs may 
require support and assistance from other SOF or conventional military 
units. 
49f'or additional information on biological agents see the U.S. Office of Technical Assessment, 1993, p. 71. 
50Special mission unit is a generic term used to represent a group of operations and support personnel from 
designated organization that are task organized to perform a specific mission (Office of the Chairman, Joint Pub 
3-05, 1992, p. GL-20). 
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E. UNITED STATES TIIEATER l\IlSSILE RECONNAISSANCE AND 
STRIKE CAPABil.ITIES 
This section discusses the theater targeting processes used by the 
theater CINC staff. By developing joint doctrine and JTIPs that maximize 
the strengths of both conventional and SOF reconnaissance and strike 
capabilities, the theater CINC's capability to conduct attack operations 
against TMs is greatly improved. 
1. United States Theater Target Planning Procedures 
The difficulty in targeting and destroying TMs rests with the targeting 
process and the C4 process. To better employ all U.S. deep-strike assets 
within a theater of operations, the theater targeting board and related 
procedures were developed. Targeting boards "ensure the effective 
employment of theater level deep surveillance, attack, and support 
resources." (Roach, 1989, p. 2) 
The theater level intelligence collection assets available during the 
Persian Gulf War included the E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System 
(AWACS) aircraft, the Joint SuIVeillance and Target Attack Radar System 
(JSTARS), Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), and high performance 
aircraft fitted with intelligence collection equipment. (Department of 
Defense, 1992, pp. 684 and 709) 
The deep-strike assets available during the Persian Gulf War included 
the F-15E Eagle, F-16 Fighting Falcon Multi-Role Aircraft, F/A-18 Hornet 
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Strike Fighter, F-111 Aardvark Strike Fighter, F-117A Night Hawk Stealth 
Fighter, and the B-52 Stratofortress Bomber. (Department of Defense, 1992, 
pp. 694, 696, 704, 699, 702, and 674). 
Targeting boards are oriented toward wartime mission 
accomplishment. In peacetime, they ·are required to identify potential 
critical targets, collect the necessary intelligence, and assign those targets 
to forces for destruction should a war occur. The forces assigned targets 
may be actual forces under control of the CINC. In other circumstances, the 
forces may only be identified for deployment to the theater in time of crisis. 
The problem faced by the targeting board is threefold. First, a 
targeting board's peacetime guidance is not specific and rests on numerous 
assumptions about future conflicts and their most likely aggressors. Second, 
the targeting board is forced to rely on intelligence that is readily available. 
This intelligence is inadequate to cover mobile targets like TMs. Finally, 
the target board is oriented to support the preponderance of the military 
reconnaissance and strike assets. These assets capabilities are significantly 
different from SOF reconnaissance and strike capabilities. 
The CINC develops his strategic concept, operation plans (OPLANs), 
and concept plans (CONPLANs) in peacetime. As the threats change the 
strategic concept must be reevaluated. Changes in the strategic concept 
cause changes to the existing OPLANs and CONPLANs. The OPLANs 
assume that the forces identified for deployment into theater will be 
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available. Any critical target list developed is based on these assumptions. 
These assumptions force targeting boards to work under the unwritten 
philosophy that the larger the database of targets, the more likely it is that 
they will have the required information on critical targets. (Roach, 1989, p. 
6) 
Once the relations between the United States and a potential 
aggressor shift from peacetime competition to conflict, the theater CINC can 
modify his strategic concept, OPLANs, and CONPLANs. This new 
information allows the military planners to develop a prioritized critical 
target list. The target board then scrubs its laundry list of targets to match 
the critical target list. Intelligence is gathered for any critical targets not 
previously identified. These new critical targets are placed on the critical 
target list and forces are assigned for their destruction or neutralization. 
Because the entire targeting and intelligence process is focused on 
assets designed to destroy large, fixed targets, it takes significant external 
political pressure to focus assets on small, highly mobile, easily camouflaged 
targets. A massive missile attack against civilians of a democratic state or 
the possible designation of a United States led coalition are two historical 
examples of external pressure. Short of this type of external pressure, the 
military will follow its targeting procedures. 
The targeting board is forced to rely on available intelligence. This 
intelligence consists mainly of imagery intelligence (IMIN1) and 
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photographic intelligence (PHOTIN1). Overhead imagery is ideally suited 
for monitoring large, fixed installations. Small, mobile, easily camouflaged 
targets, like TMs, are too difficult to monitor in peacetime based on current 
OPLANs and CONPLANs and available intelligence assets and capabilities. 
As a result, the board targets only fixed installations. 
Finally, the preponderance of deep reconnaissance, strike, and support 
assets is Air Force aircraft. Army attack helicopters and ATACMS make up 
the remainder of the conventional deep strike assets. These conventional 
weapon platforms have similar employment characteristics, strengths, and 
weaknesses, however, special operations forces have entirely different 
employment characteristics, strengths, and weaknesses. 
2. Military Reconnaissance and Strike Asset Capabilities 
The targeting board, which is composed of personnel that understand 
confidential military reconnaissance and strike capabilities, view potential 
targets with these capabilities and limitations in mind. Military 
reconnaissance and strike asset strengths are: high speed; an ability to 
cover a large area; an ability to carry numerous types of equipment or 
munitions; and their immunity from most enemy defenses. Military 
reconnaissance and strike assets depend on speed for security and 
protection and cover large distances quickly. These conventional 
reconnaissance and strike assets can employ numerous types of intelligence 
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collection equipment or strike munitions. The different types of collection 
allow reconnaissance assets to collect imagery intelligence (IMIN1), signal 
intelligence (SIGIN1), and measurement and signature intelligence 
(MASINl).51 Strike assets can carry an assortment of precision strike or 
non-precision or dumb munitions. Conventional reconnaissance and strike 
assets are immune from most enemy defenses. General purpose forces and 
civilians are not normally threats to them. Only antiaircraft defenses are 
threats. 
Strike asset capabilities also can deliver large quantities of explosives, 
(i.e., firepower) on target. They are effective against large, fixed targets 
visible from great distances or high altitudes. Strike assets are accurate, 
especially when using precision guided munitions. To be employed, they 
require limited intelligence, primarily overhead imagery. Except for 
ATACMS, once launched on a mission, the target can be switched in flight 
if the aircraft or helicopter is carrying munitions suitable for the new target. 
(Roach, 1989, pp. 9-10) 
Strike assets weaknesses include the possibility of inflicting significant 
collateral damage. This is caused by using warheads that are too powerful. 
Most aircraft ordnance is also not precision guided. The lack of precision 
51For information on intelligence and collection see Office of the Chairman, Joint Pub 2-0, Joint Doctrine for 
Intelligence Support to Operations, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993. 
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guidance increases the circular error of probability (CEP).52 If targets are 
small and well camouflaged, high performance aircraft traveling at high 
speeds and high altitudes have difficulty acquiring targets. (Roach, 1989, 
pp. 9-10) 
3. Army Special Operations Force's Reconnaissance and Strike 
Assets 
Anny SOF assets available to the theater CINCs include the Special 
Forces (SF) Groups, the Ranger Regiment, and the Special Mission Units 
(SMUs). Each of these forces has different strengths and weaknesses. It is 
their different capabilities that make each of them an important asset in 
.ITMD attack operations. 
a. ~Special Forces 
The first asset available to each of the theater CINCs are Anny 
Special Forces. 
(1) Strengths. EachCINChastheirowndedicated, area 
oriented SF Group. Several CINCs, including European Command 
(EUCOM), Pacific Command (PACOM), and Southern Command 
(SOUTHCOM), have forward deployed SF battalions in their theaters. The 
other CINCs, and the remainder of the SF Groups oriented to the EUCOM, 
52A CEP is an indicator of the delivery accuracy of a weapon system. It is used as a factor in determining 
probable damage to a target. It is the radius of a circle within which half of a missile's projectiles are expected 
to fall. (Office of the Chairman, Joint Pub. 1-02, 1994, p. 67) 
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PACOM, and SOUTHCOM theaters, are based in the continental United 
States. Each SF Group is oriented to one theater. 
A twelve-man SF operational detachment (ODA) is ideally 
suited to conduct small unit Special Reconnaissance (SR) tasks of pre-strike 
reconnaissance, target acquisition, and post-strike reconnaissance. If 
necessary, the detachment can split into smaller, highly mobile, easily 
concealed TM assets or infrastructure in a scenario where TMs are armed 
with conventional weapons. Their small size also gives them a limited 
Direct Action (DA) strike capability. The SF ODA also has a limited 
capability to recover items of high value intelligence, military, and political 
importance. 
(2) Weaknesses. While the small size of an SF ODA 
make it ideally suited for SR missions, it significantly limits its DA 
capability. An SF ODA does have a limited standoff or long-range strike 
capability. That capability, however, is a capability of last resort, to be used 
when all other means have failed. 
(3) Conclusion. An SF ODA's specialized training, small 
size and area orientation make them an ideal asset for pre-strike 
reconnaissance, target acquisition, post-strike reconnaissance, and a limited 
high value item recovery capability. 
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b. The Ranger Regiment 
The Ranger Regiment is another force available to the theater 
CINCs. The Ranger Regiment's size and mission focus give it a completely 
different capability from an SF unit. 
(1) Strengths. The Ranger Regiment is better suited to 
execute strike operations. Ranger strike operations would be operations 
against larger TM infrastructure or TM security forces. Doctrine established 
by USSOCOM limits the Ranger's missions. The preferred target is multi-
company to multi-battalion sized.53 This strike capability would give the 
CINC the capability to eliminate virtually any TM infrastructure. The 
Ranger's large size would also make it easier to recover high value items. 
(2) Weaknesses. The Rangers main limitation is they 
only conduct large-scale strike operations. Rangers are not oriented and 
trained for small scale independent operations like SR. A second limitation 
is the Rangers are not area oriented. They train to operate worldwide. 
Finally, the theater CINCs do not have dedicated Ranger units. They must 
be requested and their deployment authorized by the Secretary of Defense. 
If there were possible conflicts developing in two theaters nearly 
simultaneously, it is possible that one CINC's request would be denied. 
53A regiment consists of three battalions. Battalions consist of four companies, three rifle companies and one 
headquarters/support company. Each rifle company consists of three rifle platoons and a weapons platoon. 
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(3) Conclusion. The Ranger Regiment's specialized 
training and larger size make them an ideal asset in strike operations 
against TM infrastructure or heavily guarded facilities. They have the 
manpower available to recover high value items. The Rangers are not 
designed to conduct small scale SR operations. 
c. Special Mission Units 
The SMUs are the third SOF asset available to the CINCs. 
These specially trained units would be the ideal force for use in a limited TM 
WMD scenario. They could be one of the nation's first lines of defense 
against TMs armed with WMDs. While SMUs are national level assets, any 
theater with a potential TM WMD threat would get these assets. As in the 
Persian Gulf War, SMUs can also operate in a conventionally armed TM 
scenario. If SMU assets need augmentation, either SF, Ranger, or 
conventional elements would be selected. The capabilities required would 
determine which force was selected. 
4. Army Special Operations Force Reconnaissance and Strike 
Capabilities 
Army SOF SR and DA capabilities can immediately enhance JTMD 
attack operation capabilities. Special Reconnaissance missions include 
conducting pre-strike reconnaissance, target acquisition tasks in support of 
conventional strike forces, and post-strike reconnaissance, also called Battle 
Damage Assessment (BOA) to determine the success of a strike. 
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Direct Action missions include strikes against TMs, TELs and 
infrastructure, and/or recovery- of designated personnel or material (Office 
of the Chairman, Joint Pub. 3-05, 1992, p. 11-7). Material recovery-
operations could also be conducted following a conventional strike against 
TM targets. 
Special operations forces small size, stealthy reconnaissance, and 
precision destructive capabilities can be enhanced when combined with 
conventional weapons platforms. Special operations forces strengths can 
make up for the weaknesses of conventional strike assets. In many 
circumstances, combining both forces in attack operations against TMs can 
enhance mission success, while limiting the possibility of collateral damage. 
5. A Theater Missile Targeting Solution 
The combination of SOF and conventional reconnaissance and strike 
capabilities creates a virtually unbeatable combination. Special operations 
forces have the capability to locate, identify, and designate targets for high 
performance strike aircraft. This SOF capability increases bombing 
accuracy and survivability of the aircraft and the survivability of the SOF 
element. Work has been done to develop JTTPs to enhance this target 
designation capability.54 
54For additional information on Laser Target Designation Operations, see Joint Pub. 3-09.1, Joint Laser 
Designation Procedures, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991. For information on Radar Beacon Operations, 
see Joint Pub. 3-09.2, JTTP for Radar Beacon Operations, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993. 
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The peacetime implementation of JTTPs that integrate SOF into attack 
operations against TMs is required. Joint tactics, techniques, and 
procedures provide the necessary framework for SOF to train, eliminating 
many problems in planning and executing strategic operations on very short 
notice. Joint tactics, techniques, and procedures also allow different SOF 
and conventional units to train together and develop high confidence in their 
combined abilities to execute difficult operations. 
During times of conflict, SOF and conventional units can combine and 
incorporate the necessary intelligence and support quickly. This is possible 
because the specific intelligence and support requirements have already 
been established by previous exercises that incorporated JTTPs. Even if the 
SOF and conventional units have not worked together, if they have 
participated in exercises or practiced JTTPs with other units, any mission 
training that is required will be reduced. This commonality of training of 
JTTPs makes them critical. Since each element knows and understands the 
JTTPs, the probability of mission success significantly increases. 
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IV. OPERATIONS AGAINST GERMAN V WEAPONS 
Despite the best efforts of the Allied Air Forces, they were unable to stop 
the launching of V-ls and V-2s against Great Britain and the Continent. 
Neither the strategic bombing attacks against the manufacturing and 
transportation infrastructure nor the tactical bombing of storage facilities and 
launch sites could stop the V weapon launches. The V weapon attacks against 
British cities continued until Allied ground forces overran the weapon launch 
sites and forced the firing units to withdraw out of range. 
A. DEVELOPMENT OF THE V WEAPONS 
The Treaty of Versailles limited the amount of artillery the Germans were 
allowed to possess. In 1931 in an apparent effort to overcome legally this 
restriction, the German Army adopted an idea to bombard distant objectives 
with remote controlled pilotless aircraft. The Army ultimately decided to use 
rockets for long-range bombardment. Meanwhile, the Luftwaffe began 
conducting research on rocket powered aircraft. In 1936, the German War 
Office and Air Ministry agreed to share costs of developing a test site on a 
German island located on the edge of the Baltic Sea (Collier, 1964, pp. 153-155). 
The facilities were called Peenemunde, after the small village located on the 
island (Kennedy, 1983, p.12). 
Early in the development of both weapons, disagreement emerged 
regarding how to employ the weapons. At Peenemunde, there were two 
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schools of thought. The scientists, engineers, and technicians, wanted to fire 
the missiles from massive bunkers. These facilities could contain storage, 
testing, and servicing facilities. They believed that would make servicing, 
storage, and launch of the weapons easier, enhancing the effectiveness of both 
weapons. Army and Luftwaffe officers, were more interested in the combat 
survivability of the weapons. They wanted mobile field batteries. The military 
officers believed this was the only way to ensure the survivability and 
effectiveness of the weapons. A compromise between the two positions was 
worked out. Each V weapon was deployed using two battalion sized units of 
field launchers and one battalion operating from hardened bunker facilities. 
(Kennedy, 1983, p. 30) 
While the Army rocket program continued, the Luftwaffe developed a 
prototype of an unmanned photo reconnaissance aircraft. At the beginning of 
World War II, the Luftwaffe prepared plans to employ a pilotless flying bomb 
with a range of 350 miles. These plans were not put into action until 1942. In 
that year, the British began the practice of fire bombing German cities. These 
attacks incensed Hitler. He ordered terror attacks of a retaliatory nature must 
be directed against British cities. (Collier, 1964, p. 15) 
This order resurrected the Luftwaffe's project and helped the Army 
continue its development program. The Luftwaffe's weapons became known 
as the Vengeance Weapon-1.55 The Army's weapon became Vengeance 
55The most accurate description of the V-1 is a flying bomb. It is neither a rocket or missile. 
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Weapon-2.56 (Kennedy, 1983, p. 5) Because of Hitler's new emphasis, the 
Luftwaffe could now divert a small amount of its resources into developing the 
V-1 (Collier, 1964, p. 14). This was accomplished without adversely affecting 
production of conventional aircraft. The Army's V-2 project, which had been 
plagued with numerous failures throughout its development, also benefited 
from its increased national priority. Because of resource constraints, until May 
1943, both programs were competing against each other. Then a committee of 
high ranking government officials, Luftwaffe officers, and Army officers 
determined that the two weapons were complimentary and not mutually 
exclusive. Each weapon's strengths and weaknesses offset the other weapon's 
strengths and weaknesses (Kennedy, 1983, pp. 19-20). 
Despite their attempt to overcome legally the Treaty of Versailles, the 
Germans maintained a high level of security around the V weapon programs. 
It was not until November 1939 that British intelligence became aware of the 
development of rockets at Peenemunde. Little intelligence effort was devoted 
to rockets and Peenemunde until 1942. Then, new information of unknown 
reliability again mentioned that rocket research and testing was being 
conducted around Peenemunde. Intelligence collected in 1942 and early 1943 
was confusing and contradictory for two reasons (Collier, 1964, pp. 158-159). 
First, the Allies were not aware that they were getting information on two 
56Different sources describe the V-2 as a rocket or a missile. The DOD Dictionary, Joint Pub. 2-01, does not 
define either term. Webster's Dictionary defines a rocket primarily as a propulsion device. It defines a missile 
as a type of weapon used to strike at something at a distance. Because of the variety and age of the sources used, 
this thesis will use the terms rocket and missile interchangably to describe a weapon designed to attack distant 
targets. 
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different types of weapons. Second, no one was initially responsible for 
collecting and analyzing the available intelligence on the V weapons. 
By April 1943 photo reconnaissance around Peenemunde began to reveal 
unusual structures. In June photo reconnaissance showed the presence of V-1 
unmanned aircraft and V-2 rockets. In early August, new information finally 
made it clear that there were two distinct weapons programs (Collier, 1964, pp. 
158-159). Even with the new intelligence and photographs, numerous high 
ranking Allied government and military leaders refused to believe that these 
new weapons were a threat. 
Ultimately, the decision to bomb Peenemunde was ordered for two 
reasons. First, something was going on there. Second, one bomber raid was 
not a significant diversion of Allied air assets. (Kennedy, 1983, p. 21) The 
British Bomber Command conducted the attack on August 17, 1943. The attack 
was declared a success despite the loss of forty aircraft. That amount 
represented about seven percent of the total aircraft involved in the operation. 
The facilities at Peenemunde were severely damaged and two important 
scientists are killed (Collier, 1964, pp. 158-159). 
The bombing forced the Germans to change tactics. The deception 
techniques that had been used up till then were increased. Reconstruction at 
Peenemunde began in secret. It was well concealed by camouflage. The bomb 
damage was left unrepaired. Within six weeks the facilities were operational 
again. Work there continued unmolested for almost nine months (Kennedy, 
1983, p. 23). The air attack on Peenemunde ultimately had little impact on 
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testing and development of the V-1. Renewed attacks on Peenemunde began 
at roughly the same time that the V-1 attacks against Great Britain commenced. 
About the same time that Peenemunde was attacked, several proposed 
production facilities in other parts of Germany were also bombed. While the 
attacks were unrelated, the German's inability to protect a large portion of its 
manufacturing base from air attacks caused them to consolidate most V weapon 
production. The V weapons manufacturing was done at an underground 
factory, at Niedersachswerfen, in the Harz Mountains (Military Analysis 
Division, 1947, p. 35). Using underground production facilities deep inside 
Germany prevented the Allies from attacking them. 
The air attack on Peenemunde also caused the Germans to disperse the 
design and testing of the V weapon programs. The testing and design of the V-
2 were moved to Blizna, Poland. Since Blizna was beyond the range of Allied 
bombers, V-2 testing and development were protected (Collier, 1964, pp. 33-34). 
Additionally, some parts for the V-2s were subcontracted out to other factories 
that were also out of range of Allied bombers. The advance of the Russians on 
the Eastern Front ultimately forced all construction to be consolidated at the 
Harz facilities. The Russian advance also closed the test facility at Blizna 
(Kennedy, 1983, pp. 29 and 34). 
By 27 August 1943, construction was underway on the first hardened V-2 
site. By October, construction was underway on most of the original V-1 ski 
ramp sites (Collier, 1964, p. 36). Security at the construction sights was 
practically nonexistent. French contractors and laborers were used in the 
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construction of the original launch sights. In December 1943, a seasoned 
artillery Commander, Lieutenant General (LTG) Erich Heinemann, assumed 
overriding responsibility for the V-1 and V-2 programs. Because of the unique 
design and construction of the V-1 ski ramp sites and the lack of security 
employed during construction, the Allies began harassment bombing on the V-1 
ski sites. General Heinemann realized that the existing launch facilities under 
construction were useless. He allowed construction on them to continue as a 
decoy while simpler, less distinctive, underground facilities were prepared 
(Collier, 1964, p. 22). Heinemann's decision was the end of the controversy 
over the best means of employing both V weapons. 
On June 13, 1944, the Germans introduced a new type of terror weapon 
for wartime use against civilian populations. The first use of the V-1 was less 
than spectacular. It exploded in the village of Swanscombe, England without 
causing any casualties. By the last attack on March 29, 1945, about 10,500 V-ls 
were launched at Great Britain. About 8,892 V-ls were launched from ramps 
in German occupied territory. About 1,600 V-ls were launched from German 
aircraft. (Collier, 1964, p. 180) 
B. THE V-1 FLYING BOMB 
The V-1 's strengths were its simple design and low manufacturing costs. 
Its few logistics requirements, including the required to use low-grade aviation 
fuel was also an advantage. Its weaknesses were its slow, straight, and level 
flight profile and its need for fixed launch ramps. (Kennedy, 1983, p. 19) 
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The V-1 was a pilotless aircraft with a single mid-wing and a wingspan 
of sixteen feet. Its overall length was twenty-five feet. The V-1 weighted over 
two tons. Its fuel weighted just over one half a ton. The warhead weighed just 
less than one half ton. Its initial range was about 160 miles. It was increased 
to about 250 miles. The V-ls were primarily fired from ramps using auxiliary 
launching devices that gave the V-1 its initial burst of propulsion at launch. 
Once clear of the ramp, the V-l's jet pulse engine took over. Because of the 
short distance to London, approximately 100 miles from the original launching 
facilities, simple and inexpensive jet-pulse engines were used. These engines 
only had a working life of between one half and one hour (Collier, 1964, pp. 
169-170). The V-1 flew at a constant speed, about 360 miles per hour, on a 
constant heading, at low altitude (Kennedy, 1983, p. 19). 
1. Launch Site Characteristics 
Originally, the German's planned to launch the V-ls from ninety-six fixed 
launch sites and two large hardened sites. The large sites were envisioned by 
the scientists and technologists as a combination service, storage, and launch 
site. Construction began on both the ninety-six ski sites and the two large 
bomb proof launch sites. The two large sites were supposed to be hardened 
with reinforced concrete to withstand even the heaviest Allied bombing attacks 
and continue launch operations. The significant construction effort involved in 
building the two large sites made them stand out as potential targets for Allied 
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bombing. The bombing was effective and neither of the two large hardened 
sites ever launched a V-1. 
The initial design of the ski ramp launch sites included a ramp, one 
square building with one open side, and a number of tunnel like buildings. The 
square building with the open side was where the magnet compass, used to 
guide the V-1, was set. The long tunnel like buildings were designed to store 
the missiles and wings before final assembly. The other distinctive 
characteristic of the ski ramp site was their orientation. The ski ramps were 
constructed on a direct magnetic azimuth with their intended targets. The open 
side of the square building was also constructed on a magnet azimuth with the 
target (Collier, 1964, p. 20). The unique design and blast construction of the 
ski ramp facilities made them easy to identify and attack from the air once the 
Allies knew what to look for. 
Modified launch sites were designed and constructed to be much more 
survivable. They consisted of concrete foundations and floors for the square 
building and an easily assembled launch rail/ramp. Prefabricated building 
components were positioned very near their concrete floors. No long storage 
buildings were constructed. The V-1 components were dispersed around the 
launch site. This practice was identical to dispersing and camouflaging aircraft 
around their airfields. The launch rails were not fixed in place until the day 
before launches began. (Collier, 1964, pp. 47 and 69) Additionally, a large 
number of antiaircraft guns were emplaced to protect the modified sites. 
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Seventy to eighty modified sites were in various stages of construction. 
When ordered to begin attacking with the V-ls on June 6, 1944, fifty to sixty of 
the completed sites were manned. Simultaneously, 873 bombs were moved by 
rail from the depots to the sites. Initial difficulties plagued the first launch 
attempts. Only four of the first ten missiles reached Great Britain. On 15 June, 
the V-1 bombardment begins. Within fourteen hours, 244 missiles hit the 
London area. (Collier, 1964, pp. 69 and 163 -164) 
2. Ease of Concealment 
The original ski sites were not concealed. This contributed to their 
abandonment. The modified launch sites were constructed using better 
techniques of security and camouflage. After construction, the concrete 
foundations and floors were camouflaged. When the prefabricated buildings 
were erected, they were also camouflaged. The components of the V-ls were 
dispersed around the launch site and camouflage. This practice was identical 
to dispersing and camouflaging aircraft around airfields. Finally, the launch 
rails were not fixed in place until the day before launches began. (Collier, 
1964, pp. 47 and 69) 
3. Ease of Maintenance and Resupply 
The V-l's design made it easy to maintain and resupply. The use of low 
grade aviation fuel also simplified the logistics requirements. Launch crews 
could complete final assembly and preparations of the flying bombs at the 
modified ski sites. Assembly included attaching the wings and adjusting the 
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magnetic guidance mechanism. All that was then left was to fuel, mount the 
V-1 and booster on the ramp, and launch it. These tasks were accomplished 
despite continued attempts to interdict launch operations by air attack. 
The logistics network originally designed for the V-1 supported two large 
sites and ninety-six ski ramp sites. It consisted of eight storage depots. The 
same lack of security precautions that plagued the launch sites plagued the 
construction of these original eight depots. General Heinemann also 
abandoned these facilities. Three new storage depots were established. Two 
in large limestone caves and one in a railway tunnel (Collier, 1964, p. 78). 
These facilities remained operational until they were captured, still containing 
V-ls, by advancing Allied ground forces. The original supply sites also served 
as effective decoys and absorbed tons of Allied bombs. 
C. V-1 EMPLOYMENT TECHNIQUES 
The employment techniques of deception, decoys, dispersal, and using 
civilians as shields are examined. 
1. Deception 
Initial attempts to maintain the secrecy of the development and 
employment of the V-1 was successful. Allied intelligence was aware that 
something was going on. However, it took a considerable amount of time and 
effort before they could identify the V-1 and its capabilities. The operational 
security of the hardened launch sites, the original ski sites, and their supply 
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sites was compromised. This compromise wasted a considerable amount of 
German effort and expense. However, those sites became effective decoys. 
2. Decoys 
The Allies began bombing the two hardened sites, the original ninety-six 
ski sites, and the eight storage sites, in December 1944. Because their security 
was compromised and the Allies were consistently bombing them, all of the 
sites were abandoned. The facilities, however, became perfect decoys. While 
the Germans began building modified ski sites, the Allies continued to bomb 
the other decoy sites. 
German deception was so good that it helped delay the bombing of the 
modified sites until days after the V-ls were being launched at Great Britain 
from those sites. While the Allies had been aware of the presence on the new 
modified sites, they chose to not bomb them for two reasons. First, the German 
deception had worked so well that the Allies could not be sure where the V-ls 
were being launched from. Second, the modified sites were so well 
camouflaged and constructed, the Allies decided the sites were too difficult to 
attack until there was proof that V-ls were being launched from them. 
However, after the deadly attack on the chapel at Wellington Barracks on 18 
June killed or wounded 189 civilians and service members, all V-1 launch 
sights, ski and modified, became top priority targets. (Collier, 1964, p. 69 and 
163 -164) 
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3. Dispersal of facilities 
The range and flight characteristics of the V-1 limited the German's 
ability to widely disperse their launch sites. Within these limitations however, 
German dispersal efforts were successful. Originally, two methods of launching 
V-1 had been planned, from hardened facilities and from individual ski ramps. 
While the plan to use the hardened launch facilities failed miserably, the large 
number of individually dispersed launch ramps, both decoy ski and modified 
sites, proved to be successful. The number and dispersal of both type of sites 
inhibited the Allies attempts to destroy the launchers. 
The Luftwaffe developed another effective technique launch technique 
for the V-1, by aircraft. This launch technique incorporated both employment 
techniques of mobility and dispersal. The range of the aircraft increased the 
range that V-1 launch facilities, now airfields, could be established from Great 
Britain. This increased dispersal increased the survivability of the V-ls, their 
launch aircraft, and other supporting infrastructure. Aircraft launched V-ls 
proved to be the only means of attack left to the Luftwaffe until after 
modifications to increase the range of the V-1 were completed. 
4. Using Civilians as Shields 
There was no direct attempt to use civilians as shields to protect the V-1 
launch sites from Allied air attack. 
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D. V-1 PHASES OF EMPLOYMENT 
The employment of V-1 weapons can be broken into four phases. Phase 
One lasted about three months. It began on 13 June and lasted until the middle 
of September 1944. This phase involved the heaviest attacks against Great 
Britain. Phase Two lasted for about four months. It began on 23 September 
1944 and lasted until 20 January 1945. This phase consisted of attacks against 
Great Britain by aircraft launched V-ls. Phase Three lasted six months. It 
began in October 1944 and continued until March 1945. It consisted of a heavy 
bombardment campaign against targets on the European continent. Phase Four 
lasted about one month. It began on 1 March 1944 and ended on 29 March 
1945. Phase Four consisted of renewed attacks on Great Britain by modified 
longer range V-ls. 
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MAIN TARGET ESTIMATED APPROACHED OR 
IA UN CHES REACHED THE 
COAST 
PHASE ONE 
13 July to Mid- GREAT BRITAIN 7408 6743 
September 1944 
PHASE TWO 
23 September 1944 to GREAT BRITAIN 701 638 
20 January 1945 
PHASE FOUR 
1- 29 March 1945 GREAT BRITAIN 137 125 
PHASE THREE 
October 1944 to EUROPE 7,821 6,518 
March 1945 
Table 1. V-1 Phases of Employment (Military Analysis Division, 1947, p. 15) 
E. THE V-l's EFFECTIVENESS 
London was the main V-1 target in Great Britain. It received most of the 
strikes. Antwerp, Belgium received the majority, eighty-eight percent, of all 
continental strikes. Because of the shorter range, attacks against Antwerp were 
more concentrated and accurate. Attacks slowed the clearing of the port and 
the unloading of supplies. This slightly diminished the usefulness of Antwerp 
to the Allied Armies. (Military Analysis Division, 1947, pp. 14-15) 
Two factors limited the effectiveness of the V-1. First, the accuracy of 
the weapon prevented it from being used on point targets, including critical 
military facilities, in Great Britain. The accuracy and reliability required that 
many missiles had to be fired to achieve a significant effect. This required the 
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production, transportation, and maintenance of large stocks of V-ls to sustain 
a useful rate of fire (Collier, 1964, p. 139). Additionally, the low, slow, and 
straight flight path from Northern France enabled the British to establish an 
effective defense plan. 
F. DEFENSES AGAINST THE V-1 
A series of antiaircraft defense measures was established. They proved 
to be highly successful against the V-ls. These measures included the use of 
radar, antiaircraft guns, balloons, and attacks by fighter aircraft (Military 
Analysis Division, 1947, p. 17). Radar was useful because it gave the other 
defensive measures and the civilians warning and time to prepare for the 
attacks. This was possible because of the slow speed of an approaching V-1. 
Radar also helped vector fighter aircraft in on the V-ls. 
In December 1943, the British began to prepare an initial air defense 
plan, called Overlord Diver, for use against the V-1. In part, the plan called for 
the employment of 1,332 antiaircraft guns to be deployed. In February 1944, 
the British adopted an air defense plan that emphasized the protection of the 
military forces that were massing for the invasion. Five hundred seventy guns 
were authorized for defense against the V-ls until the invasion. After the 
invasion, the plan was to reduce the number of guns devoted to V-1 defense to 
three hundred eighty-four. (Collier, pp. 159-163) 
On the morning of 13 June 1944 after the first few V-ls struck Great 
Britain, the Chiefs of Staff Committee, composed of senior Allied Officers that 
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represented their commands, decided to not implement Overlord Diver yet. By 
15 June, however, the British were hurriedly implementing and attempting to 
improve Overlord Diver. Anti-aircraft guns increased to over 900. Balloons, 
which trailed cables that damaged V-ls, were increased from 400 to 1,000. And 
fighters were formed into three separate belts with the first one starting in the 
middle of the English Channel. (Saunders, 1954, pp. 157-158) 
By late June 1944, the defensive measures were beginning to eliminate 
many incoming V-ls. As the bombardment continued into the fall and winter 
of 1944, the defenders refined their capabilities. In some cases, they destroyed 
as many as ninety percent of the incoming V- ls. In all, a total of 3,957 V-ls 
were destroyed by British defenses. Aircraft accounted for 1,847 destroyed. 
Anti-aircraft guns accounted for 1,866 destroyed. Balloons, cables hanging 
from them, intercepted 232 V-ls. (Saunders, 1954, p. 169) Besides the active 
defensive measures employed by the British, they still had a significant civil 
defense organization and capability in place. 
G. THE V-2 ROCKET 
The V-2 rocket's strengths were its mobility, flight trajectory, and speed. 
The V-2's trajectory and speed made it immune from all known air defense 
countermeasures. The mobility of the V-2 came from its ability to be fired by 
mobile field launchers. These mobile launchers made it impossible to attack 
the V-2 before it was launched. The mobile launchers could fire a missile and 
move before being detected and attacked by Allied air reconnaissance and 
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strike assets (Kennedy, 1983, p. 19). The V-2s weaknesses included its overall 
complexity and need for special propellants. 
The V-2 was an Army program and originally designated as the A-4. It 
was a gyroscopically-stabilized finned rocket forty-six feet long. Without fuel, 
but with a one-ton warhead containing 1,650 lbs. of explosives, the V-2 
weighted just under four tons. The diameter of the body at its widest point was 
nearly five-and-a-half feet. At the fins, the V-2's diameter was close on twelve 
feet. The missile carried roughly four tons of a three-to-one mixture of ethyl 
alcohol and water and about five tons of liquid oxygen. Its total weight at 
takeoff was nearly thirteen tons. The maximum range of the V-2 in its standard 
configuration was two hundred to two hundred and twenty miles. The missile 
reached a height of fifty to sixty miles at peak trajectory. The V-2's speed 
reached a maximum of 3,600 miles per hour. Its speed fell to between 2,200 to 
2,500 miles per hour immediately before impact (Collier, 1964, pp. 180-181). 
The length and fin span of the V-2 was based on the largest size object that 
could be transported through railroad tunnels and small villages (Kennedy, 
1983, p. 9). 
1. Launch Site Characteristics 
At first, as with the V-1, the Germans attempted to construct two large 
hardened bombproof bunker facilities for launching V-2s. The first, near 
Watten, was designed to store 108 missiles, a three-day supply of fuel, and a 
liquid oxygen plant. Allied bomber attacks destroyed the bunkers while they 
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were under construction. (Kennedy, 1983, p.31) There is no evidence that V-2s 
were launched from bunkers. 
The V-2 was launched from mobile launchers. It was launched in an 
upright position from a portable stand resting on a concrete or other hard 
surface. It was launched from prepared hard sites for two reasons. First, early 
rockets were test fired without some form of hard stand underneath. One test 
launch crashed after takeoff because one of the launcher's legs had sunk into 
the dirt and mud and canted the rocket too far for it to correct its trajectory 
after launch. General Heinemann, who was partially responsible for V-2s 
launching from mobile launchers, ordered that they be fired only from concrete 
platforms (Kennedy, 1983, p. 32). The second reason it was practical to fire the 
V-2 from some form of prepared site was because the rocket generated twenty-
five tons of initial thrust at launch. Some form of hard stand was also required 
for the attendant vehicles. There were forty-five launch points prepared. They 
consisted of groups of concrete platforms for the V-2 and its supporting 
vehicles. (Collier, 1964, pp. 16, 67, and 180-182) 
2. Ease of Concealment 
After abandoning the idea of launching V-2s from hardened facilities, 
concealment became paramount in all aspects on V-2 transportation and 
operations. Concealment began at the underground factory where railroad 
transporters were camouflaged with special covers to conceal the V-2s. After 
being off loaded from the railroad cars, the missiles were transported to the 
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final preparation area arid then to their launch sites by special wheeled trailers 
that had special camouflaged covers. (Kennedy, 1983, pp. 43-44) 
To conceal the launch sites, pine forests were preferred. They made 
aerial detection difficult and provided a wind screen for the V-2s in their 
upright position. Final preparation areas were selected with concealment in 
mind. This was necessary because the preparation sites contained numerous 
large tents and parking areas. They were also selected for their proximity to 
the launch sites. Launch sites were also picked based on their proximity to the 
railroad and the quantity and type of roads nearby. (Kennedy, 1983, pp. 43-44) 
Additionally, the less time the V-2s spent in vulnerable forward preparation and 
firing positions, the fewer their chances of their being detected and interdicted 
by Allied air assets. 
3. Ease of Maintenance and Supply 
The missile storage facilities constructed to support the V-2s included 
seven main depots, four field storage depots, and six transit depots. Rocket fuel 
component liquids were also stored at separate locations. There were two main 
storage sites for liquid oxygen. There were two main depots and eight field 
depots to store alcohol. (Collier, 1964, p. 67) 
During initial testing and use, the Germans learned that the longer a V-2 
was stored, the greater the chance for a misfire. This caused the Germans to 
abandon their missile storage sites. Instead, they developed the technique of 
rapid rail transport directly from the underground factory to the firing units and 
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launch sites. These missile trains carried all of the necessary missile 
components, except the fuel and transporter-erectors. The trains carried twenty 
missiles and their components, including warheads packed in shipping 
containers, jet vanes, and fuses. (Kennedy, 1989, p. 45) 
The V-2 was a very complex weapon. It also required three different 
rocket fuel components and an igniter. Because of the complexity of V-2, the 
handling and launching of the missiles demanded more specialized training and 
organization of the personnel involved. A V-2 Launch Battery was organized 
into four troops. A Headquarters Troop, a Fuel and Rocket Troop, a Technical 
Troop, and a Launch Troop. Each troop was subdivided into platoons and 
sections as necessary to execute their missions. The Headquarters Troop was 
reasonable for the Launch Battery. The Fuel and Rocket Troop was responsible 
for transporting the missile from the railhead to the Technical Troop's final 
preparation area and fueling the rocket. They used specially camouflaged, 
wheeled trailers. The Fuel and Rocket Troop also transported the rocket fuel 
components, liquid oxygen, alcohol, hydrogen peroxide, to the launch site. 
Sodium permanganate, the final component needed to initiate the launch, was 
packaged at the factory and shipped with the missiles. (Kennedy, 1983, p. 44) 
The Technical Troop was responsible for off loading missiles at the 
railhead. At the final preparation area, the Technical Troop inspected, 
conducted minor repairs, and mounted the warheads on the V-2s. Special 
rubber protection cases were put on the V-2 to protect it on the final leg of its 
trip. The V-2 was then placed on a Meilerwagen, a combination wheeled 
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transporter and missile erector, for final transport to the launch site. (Kennedy, 
1983, pp. 44-46) 
The Launch Troop transported the V-2 to the launch site. The site was 
normally set up with a fire control vehicle, portable launch pad, and electrical 
cables prior to the V-2's arrival. If camouflage was insufficient, overhead 
camouflage was also setup around the launch site. The V-2 was positioned on 
the concrete firing pad and erected onto the portable launch pad using the 
hydraulic lift on the Meilerwagen. The Launch Troop removed the protective 
shipping covers and conducted final checks and inspections. A platoon within 
the Fuel and Rocket Troop was responsible for fueling the V-2 while the final 
checks were being conducted. Three different fuel trucks, one for each 
separate fuel component, were required to fuel the V-2. First, the alcohol was 
loaded. Second, the liquid oxygen was loaded. Third, the hydrogen peroxide 
was loaded. Finally, the sodium permanganate was added. Arming the 
warhead was the final requirement before firing. (Kennedy, 1983, pp. 45-46) 
H. V-2 EMPLOYMENT TECHNIQUES 
The employment techniques of deception, decoys, dispersal, and using 
civilians as shields are examined. 
1. Deception 
As with the V-1, the Germans employed an effective campaign of 
deception against the Allies. It began after the 1931 decision to develop rockets 
85 
and lasted until V-2 attackS against the Great Britain began. Despite some 
limited successes, Allied attempts to gather intelligence on the V-2 were 
unsuccessful. The British air attack against Peenemunde also had very little 
negative effect on the development and testing of the V-2. In fact, the air attack 
caused the German's to move V-2 test and production out of range of Allied 
bombers. 
2. Decoys 
Allied bomber attacks against the hardened V-2 launch sites convinced 
the Germans to abandon efforts to launch the V-2 from those facilities. The 
Germans then decided to only use mobile launchers. As with the V-1 hardened 
sites, the V-2 hardened sites served as effective decoys for Allied air strikes. 
3. Dispersal of Facilities 
The longer range of the V-2 made it less of a factor in the dispersal of the 
forty-five prepared V-2 launch sites. The mobility of the V-2s and its logistic 
infrastructure, enhanced the German's capability to disperse them. The Allies 
never destroyed a V-2 rocket that was being prepared for launch. 
Bombing of V-2 related production facilities caused the Germans to 
consolidate most of V-2 production into one underground site. This is an 
example where the survivability of a weapon's production facility was improved 
by consolidating its components at one location. This was effective for two 
reasons. First, the Germans could not stop the Allied air attacks. Second, the 
underground facility was also out of range of Allied bombers. 
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4. Using Civilians as Shields 
From September 1944 until March 1945, the Germans launched V-2s 
from around the Hagile in Holland (Collier, 1964, pp. 172-173). The German's 
use of Dutch civilians as shields limited the Allies' willingness to bomb possible 
launch sites. Initially, the Allies attempted to only attack V-2 targets that were 
at least 250 yards from the nearest building known to house Dutch civilians 
(Collier, 1964, p. 129). The Allies even attempted to get permission from the 
Dutch government in exile in Great Britain to bomb launch facilities in and 
near populated areas. The Dutch government never responded to the Allied 
request. Instead, the Dutch government agreed not to object to "well chosen" 
attacks (Collier, 1964, p. 129). 
I. THE V-2's EFFECTIVENESS 
The V-2s were employed as terror weapons to seek revenge against the 
British civilian population. In this capacity they were effective. From 6 
September 1944 until 27 March 1945, 1,115 V-2s reach Great Britain. Of those, 
518 hit London or its suburbs. There were 2,754 deaths and 6,523 serious 
injuries in London alone. (Kennedy, 1983, p. 40) 
The V-2 was also used as a bombardment weapon against high value 
military targets on the continent. Against closer range targets, they were more 
effective. As a bombardment weapon against military targets, the V-2 was 
primarily used against the Allied resupply facilities at the port of Antwerp, 
Belgium. The first V-2 was fired against a continental target on the 13 
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September 1944. On 12 October 1944, Hitler decided that Antwerp was the 
primary continental target. On the continent, V-2s killed 5,400 persons, 
wounded 22,000 people, and destroyed 90,000 houses (Kennedy, 1983, p. 51). 
This secondary mission was necessary because by this point of the war, the 
Germans had no other way to bombard Allied military facilities. 
J. DEFENSE AGAINST THE V-2 
Because of its steep trajectory and high speed, no effective defense 
against the V-2 was developed. One plan developed in December 1943 involved 
concentrating a high volume of anti-aircraft flack on the radar predicted 
trajectory of the falling missile (Collier, 1964, p. 174). There is no evidence that 
a V-2 was ever shot down (Military Analysis Division, 1947, p. 17). 
The speed of the V-2 also did not allow sufficient time for the civil 
defenses to respond. By the time a launch was identified and the civil defense 
sirens activated, the V-2 was already exploding on its target. Civilians were 
unable to take passive defensive measures with so little warning. 
K. THE V WEAPONS' EFFECTIVENESS 
At their maximum ranges, the V weapons were not accurate enough to 
strike militarily targets. Both the V-1, and later the V-2, were extremely as 
terror weapons against the British civilian population. 
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The attacks caused widespread damage, many casualties, and a 
considerable reduction of industrial efficiency ... They had, 
however, little or no military effect. (Military Analysis Division, 
1947, p. 16) 
Twice, the Allies were forced to refocus their air and ground offensive 
operations in attempts to capture and overrun areas of the continent where the 
V weapons were fired from. 
Even if the V-1 had little direct military effect, it had an impact on the 
civilian population and leaders of Great Britain. After the bombardment began 
on June 15 and the first mass casualties were received on 18 June, air support 
for the invasion, except in emergency circumstances, lost its high priority. 
Prior to June 18, the government officials trusted the military 's judgement and 
were satisfied with the low priority the V-1 facilities had received. The attacks 
on the civilian population caused British politicians to apply pressure on 
General Eisenhower to reprioritize Allied military efforts. General Eisenhower 
was forced to shift significant air assets from covering the invasion beachhead 
to destroy and suppress V-1 launch sites. This major effort by the Allies against 
the V-ls lasted until the first phase of the V-1 attacks against Great Britain were 
stopped. The V-1 attacks stopped only when Allied ground forces threatened 
to overrun V-1 launching sites in Northern France. This forced the V-1 launch 
units to withdraw. The Germans then had to depend on aircraft launched V-ls 
to strike Great Britain. This method of employing the V- ls was less effective 
and it reduced the pressure on the British civilians. 
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Just when the Allied warning and air defenses against the V-1 attacks 
were beginning to enjoy successes, the swift and deadly V-2s attacks began. 
The V-2s reapplied pressure on the British population. In tum, the civilians 
reapplied pressure on their elected representatives. This pressure forced 
General Eisenhower to again redirect Allied efforts. Allied ground efforts were 
redirected further northeast into the low countries in an attempt to overrun all 
of the potential V-1 and V-2 launching sights. This was one reason that General 
Montgomery's Operation Market Garden was approved. (Ryan, 1974, pp. 84-88) 
The success of V-ls attacks compared to V-2 attacks is debatable. Basil 
Collier, who wrote about both V-ls and V-2s, contends the V-ls were more 
effective than the V-2s. The low flight profile and loud engine noise made the 
V-1 attacks noticeable to the public. The final glide before detonation increased 
the amount of secondary damage to structures. British factory production 
information taken during the height of the V-1 attacks indicates the attacks 
reduced total factory output. These facts combined to make the V-1 an 
effective terror weapon against the British population. The average V-1 flying 
bomb that landed in Great Britain killed or seriously injured between six and 
seven personnel. (Collier, 1964, p. 125) 
Gregory Kennedy, who wrote about the V-2, disagreed. He believed the 
engine cutoff and final glide of the V-1 served as a warning to personnel within 
earshot. This warning was supposed to be enough to allow people to seek last 
second protection behind any available bunker. Kennedy gives the example of 
people diving into street gutters and using the curbs to protect themselves. The 
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warheads on both weapons were nearly identical. The primary and secondary 
damage zones, which measured the degree of damage caused by the 
explosions, of both weapons were nearly identical. Kennedy believed that the 
swiftness and lack of warning of the V-2 attacks made them more effective 
terror weapons. The V-2 was more effective and spectacular because of a 
greater number of incidents with in excess of one hundred casualties per 
warhead. Kennedy uses average deaths in London as his measure of weapon 
effectiveness. There, the V-1 is credited with 2.2 deaths per round. The V-2 
caused 5.3 deaths per round. (Kennedy, 1989, p. 39) 
No matter which V weapon was the most effective, both weapons were 
effective. Both weapons caused the British population to pressure the British 
politicians. The British politicians pressured the Supreme Allied Commander 
to make every attemp to stop the attacks. 
L ALLIED INTERDICTION EFFORTS 
General Eisenhower was forced to redirect military assets in response to 
pressure from British politicians. Allied military efforts to reduce and 
ultimately eliminate the V weapon threat can be divided into four phases of 
operations. The first phase involved strategic and tactical reconnaissance and 
preemptive bomber strikes against V-1 and V-2 infrastructure and static launch 
facilities. The second phase involved increased strategic and tactical 
reconnaissance and bomber strikes against V-1 infrastructure and active launch 
sites. The third phase involved redirecting ground forces into northeastern 
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France to overrun V-1 launching sites. It also included redirecting ground force 
operations into the low countries in a similar effort to overrun V-2 launching 
sites. Only by pushing the V weapons out of range of Great Britain, could the 
Allies eliminate the V weapon threat to the British population. The fourth 
phase involved human resource intelligence (HUMIN1) operations to gather 
information on the V weapons.57 The intelligence operations got off to a slow 
start in 1939. However, they continued after the war ended. (Kennedy, 1989, 
pp. 53-56) 
1. Attack Operations Against the V Weapons' Infrastructure 
The first series of attack operations against V weapons involved strategic 
and tactical reconnaissance and bomber strikes against V-1 and V-2 
infrastructure and static launch facilities. Strategic reconnaissance and 
bombing of infrastructure included the initial attack on the research and 
development (R&D) facilities at Peenemunde, Germany and related 
manufacturing facilities at Fallersleben and Stettin, Germany. The bomber 
attack against Peenemunde, Germany was a daring operation. It was located 
deeper inside Germany then Berlin. Unfortunately, these attacks caused the 
Germans to disperse their R&D facilities, camouflage all of their V weapon 
facilities better, and ultimately manufacture them underground. German 
passive defensive measures prevented the Allied strategic bombing effort from 
57Human resource intelligence (HUMIN1) uses human beings as both the source and collector. The human 
being is the primary collection instrument. (Office of the Chairman, Joint Pub 1-02, 1994, p. 174) 
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significantly effecting V weapon operations. At best, V-1 employment was 
delayed two months. (Military Analysis Division, 1947, p. 5) 
Tactical reconnaissance and preemptive bombing focused mainly on the 
large hardened launch sites, the original ski launch sites, and original storage 
sites. All three eventually became decoy sites. Additionally, the transportation 
infrastructure in northern France was targeted. Beginning in October 1943, the 
Allies began bombing the hardened V weapon launch facilities under 
construction. In December 1943, the Allies also begin bombing ninety-five of 
the ninety-six ski ramp sites. By May 1944, photo reconnaissance revealed 
many modified underground sites under construction. It was surmised that 
they were for the V-ls. Allied fighter-bombers make one experimental attack 
on a modified site in May 1944. The attack did not effect the site. Because of 
emphasis on the invasion, there were no further air attacks on the modified 
sites. After the start of the invasion, the Allied Expeditionary Air Force Air 
Staff estimated that it would be weeks before the modified sites were 
operational. (Collier, 1964, pp. 161-162) 
Allied bombing of the large hardened facilities and ski launch sites did 
prevent their use. Unfortunately for the Allies, the attacks begin about when 
LTG Heinemann decided that the sights must become decoys. These operations 
dropped over 23,000 tons of bombs on the decoy facilities (Collier, 1964, p. 76). 
Allied bombing convinced the Germans the best way to employ V weapons was 
from modified sites and mobile launchers. 
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2. Attack Operations Against V Weapons' Launch Sites 
This series of operations included strategic and tactical reconnaissance 
and bomber strikes against V-1 launch and storage facilities and other related 
infrastructure. These operations enjoyed a high priority and continued until 
significant V-1 launches against Great Britain from northern France ended. 
After the first V-ls started striking Great Britain, the Chiefs of Staff 
Committee, decided to not modify their employment of air assets against 
German military targets. Their priority remained with the invasion forces 
(Saunders, 1954, p. 157). The Committee did allocate a very small portion, 
1,000 sorties, of their available air forces against the decoy ski ramps and the 
decoy supply depots. No serious thought was given to attacking the modified 
sites, which were launching the V-ls. Only after a V-1 attack on the Wellington 
Barracks Chapel killed or seriously injured 189 civilians, did General 
Eisenhower direct that the V-1 targets take precedence over all other targets 
except the urgent requirements in Normandy (Saunders, 1954, pp. 157 and 
158). 
Despite Allied air efforts, neither the original ninety-six decoy ski ramps 
nor their decoy supply facilities were destroyed. Neither were the actual 
modified launching sites and their underground supply depots destroyed. 
Increased daylight air attacks against the V-1 launching facilities did apparently 
cause the Germans to begin conducting some of their attacks at night. The 
Germans were moving their supplies primarily at night (Collier, 1964, pp. 132-
135). Additionally, two V-1 supply sites located in the Oise valley were 
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apparently damaged for· a short time after being attacked on 6 July. This is 
because there was a sharp drop in the number of V-1 launches immediately 
after the attack (Military Analysis Division, 1947, p. 20). Despite the continued 
air attacks against the V-1 sites, their supporting infrastructure, and 
transportation network, V-1 storage facilities captured in northern France still 
contained V-ls. From August 1943 until March 1945, the Allied air effort 
against the V weapons was 68,913 sorties and 122,133 long tons of bombs.58 
Despite air interdiction efforts, there is no evidence that a V-1 was destroyed 
during pre-launch or launch operations. There also is no evidence that a V-2 
launch platform ever received a direct hit (Collier, 1964, p. 139). 
3. Ground Operations Against V Weapon Launch Sites 
To stop the launch of V- ls from northern France, ground forces were 
redirected into northeastern France to force V-1 launch units to withdraw. 
Until this time, Allied intelligence indicated that occupying this area could also 
prevent Germany from employing its, as yet, unused V-2 rocket against Great 
Britain. This information proved to be incorrect. After V-2 attacks began, 
ground forces were again redirected northeast into the Low Countries to 
overrun V-2 launching sites or push them out of range of Great Britain. Only 
S&fhis information is incomplete and may under represent the actual number of missions and tons of bombs 
dropped. Early in thebomber operations, many V weapon related targets were classified and sorties and tons of 
bombs dropped were not accurately recorded for security reasons. Additionally, the Strategic Bombing Survey 
does not give much credit to tactical fighter harassment operations conducted against known or suspected V 
weapon launch sites. 
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by having ground combat forces physically occupy the launch areas could the 
Allies prevent V weapon attacks against Great Britain. 
4. Special Operations Force Operations 
World War II saw the development of modem SOF forces. Modem SOF 
developed directly from the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and 
the British Special Operations Executive (SOE). In World War II, these forces 
were not involved in DA strike operations against V weapons and their 
infrastructure. They were involved in HUMINT collection operations. These 
operations began in 1939 included gathering and passing information collected 
from indigenous underground resistance movements located in occupied 
countries. Human intelligence successes included first identifying Peenemunde 
as the V weapon R&D facility (Persico, 1979, p. 57). Information and recovered 
material provided by the Polish underground provided important information 
about the V-2 rocket. Information and recovered material from contacts in 
Sweden also provided important information about the V-2 rocket. (Collier, 
1964, p. 166) 
After testing began in Blizna, Poland, the Polish underground reported 
information on missile launches to London. The underground even captured 
a rocket that crashed in a swampy area. After hiding it, they located some 
technical experts and dismantled and examined the rocket. A 4,000-word final 
report, eighty photographs, twelve drawings and eight pieces were flown out 
of Poland by a C-47 Dakota in July 1944. (Collier, 1964, p. 167) 
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M. CONCLUSION 
Despite their best efforts, U.S. and Allied Air Forces were not able to 
destroy or interdict V weapons before they were launched at civilian and 
military targets in Great Britain and on the continent. Military leaders 
misjudged the significance of the V weapon attacks on the civilian population 
and elected leadership of great Britain. Only the V weapons' limitations and 
Germany's inability to produce and deploy them earlier in greater numbers 
prevented them from having a greater impact. 
After the war, the U.S. military conducted a strategic bombing survey. 
Strategic and tactical bombing efforts failed to stop the development, testing, 
production, transportation, and employment of the V weapons, the survey 
determined that air interdiction efforts were successful. To make this claim, a 
low standard of success was developed. The low standard was defined as 
delaying employment and production of the V weapons and degrading their 
launch capabilities. This standard was developed by taking the unrealistically 
high production plans of the Germans and saying that since the production 
figures were not met, bombing efforts must have been the cause. Bombing 
efforts deserve some credit, but not all of the credit that they claimed. This low 
standard of success was accepted and became part of the doctrine for later U.S. 
Air Force operations. This low standard appears again during the Persian Gulf 
War against the SCUD. Accepting this low standard leaves the U.S. military, 
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V. OPERATIONS AGAINST IRAQI SCUD MISSILES 
Despite the best efforts of the Coalition air and SOF assets, they could 
not stop the launch of Iraqi SCUDs at Israel and Saudi Arabia. Those attacks 
only ended when Iraq agreed to a cease fire. It took U.N. inspectors in Iraq 
after the war to locate and destroy Iraqi SCUDs. 
Two incidents prior to the Persian Gulf War demonstrate the importance 
that Iraq placed on its SCUD missile program. First, Iraq used SCUD missiles 
against Iran to help bring an end to the 1980-88 Iran/Iraq War. Second, Iraq 
threatened to use chemical weapons, employed from modified SCUD missiles, 
against Israel. 
A. THE EFFECT OF MODIFIED SCUD MISSILES ON IRAN 
From 1980-1988, Iraq and Iran were at war. Over 600 SCUD B and 
modified SCUDs were fired by both sides from 1982-88 during that war. Iran 
fired about 270 SCUD B missiles at Iraq (Lennox, 1991, p. 301). Iraq had a 
more robust SCUD missile capability and fired the first SCUD B missile at 
Iraq.59 On 27 October 1982, a single SCUD B exploded in Dezful, Iran. It 
killed twenty-one civilians and wounded over one hundred others. On 19 
December 1982, two more SCUD Bs were fired at Dezful. This time there were 
349 casualties. Iraqi SCUD B missile use against Iranian cities within range of 
59Iraq fired fifty-four Soviet Frog-7A Artillery rockets at Iranian cities in 1980-81. (Zaloga, 1988, p. 1423) 
Because of their short range, seventy kilometers, they are not theater missiles. 
99 
their SCUD B missiles continued unopposed until 1985 when Iran was able to 
obtain and employ its own SCUD B missiles. Because of Baghdad's proximity 
to the Iranian border, Iran's SCUD Bs were able to hit Baghdad, but Iraq's 
SCUD Bs could not hit Tehran. This forced Iraq to develop modified SCUDs 
capable of hitting Tehran. (Zaloga, 1988, p. 1424) 
During the War of the Cities, the term used to describe the intense 
missile attacks against the two countries' cities in 1987-88, Iraqi modified 
SCUDs had a significant impact (Eisenstadt, 1990, p. 17). Iraq fired seventy 
SCUD B missiles at various Iranian cities. More important, Iraq could now 
directly attack Tehran with missiles. Iraq fired 150 Al Hussein SCUD variants 
at Tehran (Lennox, 1991, p. 301). Despite the Al Hussein's small warhead, its 
strikes at Tehran were credited with causing panic and contributing to a decline 
in Iranian civilian morale. These attacks were credited with bringing Iran to 
the negotiating table (McNaugher, 1990, p. 5). 
B. IRAQ, ISRAEL, CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND THEATER MISSILES 
The United States has a significant level of interest in Middle Eastern 
politics. This is especially true where Israel is concerned. Domestic concerns 
help explain the White House's reaction to a speech delivered by Saddam 
Hussein on 1 April 1990. Before a public gathering that included large numbers 
of military, Saddam Hussein threatened to bum half of Israel with chemical 
weapons, if Israel attacked Iraq. In response, the White House issued a 
statement on 3 April that called the remarks "particularly deplorable and 
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irresponsible." The United States continued to talk tough to Saddam Hussein 
later in the same year when Iraqi SCUD missiles were moved closer to Israel. 
(Woodward, 1991, pp. 179 and 191) 
Saddam Hussein used unofficial channels to tell the United States that 
he did not mean his remarks to be offensive and inflammatory. He just meant 
to remind Israel he had a retaliatory capability to use against them if attacked. 
(Woodward, 1991, p. 179) Hussein he was referring to the 1981 Israeli 
preemptive air strike against the Osirak nuclear research facility south of 
Baghdad. At that time, Iraq had no means to retailiate. Hussein did not want 
to chance another strike against his rebuilt nuclear, or any other special 
weapons, programs. The preemptive attack against Osirak was somewhat 
successful because it set the Iraqi nuclear program back at least three to four 
years (Feldman, 1982, p. 141). 
Yet, the attack on Osirak taught Iraq an important lesson. That lesson 
was a reminder for Iraq not to put all of its nuclear eggs in one basket. 
Following Osirak, Iraq began an effective clandestine program for research, 
development, and fielding of WMDs and TMs. Iraq's clandestine approach 
included the used techniques of deception and dispersal. Deception limited the 
west's, including the United States', information about both programs. 
Dispersal prevented Israel, or anyone else, from attacking one site and 
destroying Iraq's weapons technologies. Iraq's SCUD acquisition, modification, 
and deployment of modified SCUDs employed these simple but effective 
techniques. 
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C. UNITED STATES CONCERNS AFfER THE INVASION OF KUWAIT 
During the early stages of Operation Desert Shield, the NCA was 
concerned about Iraqi use of SCUD missiles. Initially, General Schwarzkopf, 
the theater CINC responsible for the Middle East theater of operations known 
as Central Command (CENTCOM), also worried about SCUDs. However, those 
initial concerns soon vanished. 
As early as 4 August 1990, President Bush expressed his concerns about 
the use of Iraqi SCUDs against the Israelis during a briefing at the White House 
(Reynolds, 1994, p. 11). Intelligence estimates concerning the number of 
modified SCUD missiles that Iraq possessed ranged from 800-1000 (Woodward, 
1991, p. 268). General Schwarzkopf was present at the White House briefing. 
On 8 August, General Schwarzkopf was attempting to develop an effective air 
response option. The air response option was his only available option until 
ground forces were deployed into the area. One of General Schwarzkopf's 
concerns was the need to respond immediately if Iraq employed SCUD missiles 
armed with chemical warheads. Yet, by 17 August 1990, Iraqi SCUDs possibly 
aimed at Israel of Riyadh, Saudi Arabia were no longer considered a threat by 
General Schwarzkopf. (Reynolds, 1994, pp. 24 and 107) 
Meanwhile, the NCA was still worried about Iraqi SCUDs. In mid-
October, General Schwarzkopf and his staff were busy trying to develop a 
ground offensive campaign. The Secretary of Defense, Richard Cheney, was 
not happy with the original plan put together by General Schwarzkopf's staff. 
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As an alternative, Cheney suggested a ground offensive sweep 300-400 miles 
west of Kuwait's border. Besides being unexpected, a deep flanking attack that 
far west would allow direct ground attack against fixed SCUD sites threatening 
Israel. (Woodward, 1991, p. 294) 
The differing opinions between the NCA and senior military planners at 
CENTCO M would go unnoticed until after Iraqi began launching modified Scud 
missiles at Israel. When Israeli retaliation threatened to break apart the 
Coalition, General Schwarzkopf was forced to alter his plans and divert air 
assets to keep Israel from retaliating against Iraq. 
D. DEVELOPMENT OF THE IRAQI SCUD MISSILE PROGRAM 
Intelligence on Iraq's SCUD acquisition and modification program is 
sketchy. Possible suppliers include the USSR, the original developers of the 
missile, Libya, North Korea, or even possible internal manufacturing within 
Iraq. In 1987, Iraq announced it had test fired a new missile called the Al 
Hussein. Iraq originally claimed that it was a new design, but it soon became 
evident that it was only a modified SCUD B missile (Lennox, 1991, p. 301). 
Apparently, the Iraqis produced their modified SCUDs by cannibalizing parts 
from other SCUD Bs and reducing the warhead weight (Zaloga, 1988, p. 1425). 
The combination of these two actions increased the range of the Iraqi modified 
SCUDs to between 500 and 650 kilometers. This enhanced range allowed Iraq 
to strike at Tehran and Israel. 
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E. CHARACTERISTICS OF SOVIET SCUD MISSILES 
The original SCUD missile was designed by the Soviets shortly after 
World War II. It was based on the German V-2 plans and some original 
German engineers and scientists were involved in its development. The R-11, 
also known as the SS-lb or SCUD A, entered service in 1955. Its TEL was a 
converted tank chassis. It had a circular error of probability (CEP) of four 
kilometers. This inaccuracy was overcome by arming the SCUD A with a fifty 
kiloton tactical nuclear warhead. (Lennox, 1991, p. 301) The SCUD A's range 
was 180 kilometers. (Zaloga, 1988, p. 1426) 
An improved R-17 or SS- le SCUD B, still using the original TEL, entered 
service in 1962. It used different propellant and had a more efficient propulsion 
system. Its improved guidance system included three gyroscopic devices that 
steered the graphite rocket vanes. The missile's weight was 5.9 tons. The fuel 
weighed 3. 7 tons. The warhead weight was increased to one ton. The rocket 
itself weighted 1.2 tons. The Soviet version was designed to carry conventional 
warheads and WMDs. (Lennox, 1991, p. 301) 
Another important improvement in the SCUD B was the introduction of 
a warhead that separated from the missile during flight. This separation 
occurred during the missile's terminal phase of flight over the target. It was 
introduced to improve the accuracy of the missile. Accuracy was improved by 
preventing axial sway which is caused by the lack of weight in the empty fuel 
tanks after all the fuel has been used. This weight imbalance causes the missile 
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to wobble during the terminal phase of its trajectory. The degree of sway was 
unpredictable and reduced the missile's accuracy. Eliminating the sway 
decreased the CEP. The CEP for the SCUD A was four kilometers at the 
maximum range of 180 kilometers. The SCUD B CEP was one kilometer at its 
maximum range of 300 kilometers. (Zaloga, 1988, p. 1426) 
In 1965, a new R-17 SCUD B TEL entered service. It was based on a 
modified MAZ-543 8x8 heavy truck. The new TEL had better reliability and 
lower operating costs. Despite using wheels instead of tracks, there was only 
a small reduction in cross-country performance. (Zaloga, 1988, p. 1426) 
F. CHARACTERISTICS OF IRAQ'S SCUD MISSILES 
To produce the Al Hussein and the Al Abbas missiles, Iraqi modified 
Soviet SCUD Bs. Soviet SCUDs were cannibalized two ways. First, sections 
of the missile and fuel tanks were taken from one SCUD B and added to 
another SCUD B. The second technique was to reduce the weight of the 
payload/warhead that the missiles carried. Both techniques increased the range 
of the Iraqi modified SCUD missiles. 
1. The Al Hussein Modified SCUD Missile 
To produce the Al Hussein, Iraqi modified the SCUD B by lengthening 
its fuel tanks and by using a smaller warhead. The Al Hussein is about 12.2 
meters long and has a diameter of .88 meters. It weighs 7 ,000 kilograms at 
launch. The warhead was reduced to 500 kilograms. The range increased to 
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650 kilometers. The Al Hussein probably still uses the SCUD B guidance 
system. Using the original guidance system, at the increased range, makes the 
missile less accurate. The conventional high explosive (HE) warhead in the Al 
Hussein carries about 227 kilograms of HE. (Lennox, 1991, pp. 301-302) 
2. The Al Abbas Modified SCUD Missile 
The second modified SCUD developed by Iraq was known as the Al 
Abbas. It is about 13.75 meters long and .88 meters in diameter. It weighs 
about 8,000 kilograms at launch. Its fuel tanks were also increased and the 
warhead reduced even more. The warhead weighs about 350 kilograms. The 
Al Abbas has an estimated range of 900 kilometers. Its CEP is even greater 
than the Al Hussein, probably 1,500 meters. To hold these new missiles, Iraq 
developed a new TEL. It is called the Al Waleed. It is a converted articulating 
vehicle (Lennox, 1991, p. 301). An articulating vehicle has a hinge in the 
middle of the vehicle that allows it to bend. 
3. Iraqi SCUD Missile Characteristics 
Three employment techniques enhanced the survivability of Iraqi SCUDs: 
mobility, ease of concealment, and ease of maintenance and resupply. 
a. Mobility 
The first reason that Iraqi TELs were so difficult for the Air Force 
to destroy was their on and offroad mobility. Iraqi SCUDs are transported on, 
and fired from, modified eight-wheeled Al Waleed TELs. A command vehicle, 
similar to four wheel drive off road vehicles, accompanied each TEL. The 
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commander and/or surveyor travels in the command vehicle. There are two 
drivers/operators in the front of the TEL. There are other operators in the 
missile command post/launch facility located in the center of the TEL. The 
command post is protected against blast effects from the launch of the missile. 
Soldiers can be dispatched to provide security around the missile prior to 
launch. (McNab, 1993, pp. 33-34) 
The surveyor takes about an hour to prepare to launch a SCUD 
from an unsurveyed site. The surveyor is responsible for accurately surveying 
the site, radar tracking of balloons in the upper atmosphere, and calculating the 
angle of deflection for the missile. While this is occurring, the propellants are 
pumped into the missile. (McNab, 1993, p. 34) 
b. Ease of Concealment 
One lesson Iraq learned from Osirak was the need to conceal its 
military capabilities, including SCUD capabilities. Basic concealment 
techniques were incorporated into the Iraqi SCUD modification and 
employment program from the beginning. These techniques included 
camouflaging pre-surveyed missile launch points, missile storage facilities, and 
numerous short duration TEL hide sites. These hide sites were located between 
the storage facilities and launch sites. Other SCUD related infrastructure, 
including land line and radio communications links and antiaircraft defenses, 
was also camouflaged. 
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Iraq used highway culverts, underpasses, and desert ravines to 
camouflage its TELs. (Department of Defense, 1992, p. 167) Iraqi concealment 
techniques were so effective that U.S. national and theater intelligence 
collection capabilities were unable to locate TELs and their associated launch 
storage sites. 
c. Ease of Maintenance and Resupply 
The SCUDs that Iraq modified were first deployed by the Soviets 
in 1962. By today's standards, they are difficult to maintain and resupply. 
Based on intelligence gathered on Soviet SCUD operations during the Cold 
War, U.S. military planners made three assumptions about Iraqi maintenance 
and resupply operations. First, it would "require several hours to prepare to 
launch a missile. Second, the TEL would produce distinctive prelaunch 
signatures (Keaney and Cohen, 1993, p. 43). One of these signatures was the 
missile fueling process. Third, after launch, the TEL would have to remain in 
place for up to thirty minutes. However, to protect the TELs and their crews, 
the Iraqis reconfigured their TELs so they could move within minutes after 
launching their missile (Department of Defense, 1992, p. 167). If these 
assumptions had been accurate, they would have allowed reconnaissance and 
strike assets to engage the TELs. Unfortunately, the planning assumptions 
were wrong. 
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G. IRAQI MODIFIED SCUD MISSILE EMPLOYMENT TECHNIQUES 
Iraqi SCUD missile employment techniques included the use of 
deception, decoys, dispersal, and using civilians as shields. These techniques 
enhanced the survivability of Iraqi SCUD TELs. 
1. Deception 
Deception measures were incorporated into all aspects of Iraq's SCUD 
program, from initial development to fielding. Electronic and other 
communication signals were protected from foreign intercept. This included 
radar signatures and routine military communications. Additionally, because 
the SCUD's design was so old, no missile telemetry data was transmitted during 
test flights. 
After the invasion of Kuwait, Iraq redeployed and limited the use of their 
radars. Llmiting their routine military communications signals also reduced the 
United States and the Coalition's ability to gather intelligence necessary to 
target SCUD missiles and their infrastructure. During the air war, the 
telephone system was identified as a strategic target. It was surgically attacked 
with precision guided bombs Yet, Iraq still maintained land-line 
communications with its military forces, including SCUD facilities and units 
(Lennox, 1991, p. 301). Iraqi deception measures required U.S. and Coalition 
air forces to expend large amounts of resources locating and attacking SCUDs, 
TELs, and their infrastructure. 
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Deception measures also included restricting the outflow of information 
about the SCUD missile modification program, especially from the civilian 
scientists and technicians working on the program. The deception helped Iraq 
to procure an unknown number of SCUD Bs from unknown sources. The 
effectiveness of Iraq's deception program became evident when Iraq announced 
the existence of the missile modification program. (Lennox, 1991, p. 301) Until 
then, the existence or the extent of the program was not widely known. At the 
start of the Persian Gulf War, intelligence estimates on the number of SCUDs 
Iraq possessed ranged from 400 to 1,000. Planners used 600 SCUD missiles 
including variants, thirty-six TELs, and twenty-eight fixed launchers for target 
planning. (Department of Defense, 1992, p. 97) 
2. Decoys 
Iraqis deployed decoy TELs and decoy missiles. This technique was so 
effective that five years after the war, the exact number of Iraqi modified 
SCUDs actually destroyed is still debated.60 There are two reasons that Iraq's 
decoys were so effective. First, before the surprise invasion of Kuwait, Iraq 
was not considered a significant threat to U.S. national interests. For this 
reason, U.S. national intelligence collection assets were not focused on Iraq. 
Without these assets, there was little intelligence available on Iraqi capabilities, 
especially SCUD capabilities. 
SOf'or different totals see Miller, 1992, p. A-24; Schemmer, 1991, p. 36; Powell, April 1992, pp. 48-53; Powell, 
October 1992, pp. 32-35. 
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Second, after the invasion, the Iraqis restricted the ability of U.S. national 
intelligence assets to monitor SCUD missile activities. These actions limited 
U.S. intelligence analysts' capabilities to determine decoy TELs and missiles 
from real TELs and missiles. This intelligence shortfall required U.S. and 
Coalitions assets to destroy every SCUD target, real and decoy. This wasted 
valuable military assets and needlessly placed U.S. and Coalition personnel at 
risk. 
3. Dispersal 
Dispersal was accomplished by constructing multiple launch and storage 
facilities in the eastern and western portions of Iraq. There were up to five 
separate SCUD complexes in western Iraq. There were also training launchers 
in eastern Iraq (Department of Defense, 1992, p. 97). By dispersing the 
facilities throughout the country, targeting and destroying them becomes more 
difficult. In western Iraq within range of Israel, there were at least two main 
missile facilities. The complexes in eastern Iraq were within range of targets 
in Iran. Those same eastern facilities were also within range of targets in Saudi 
Arabia. Each of these facilities serviced multiple TELs. Each TEL could 
operate from multiple launch sites and hide sites near the facilities. These 
launch sites include sUIVeyed and unsurveyed launch points. 
4. Using Civilians as Shields 
During Operation Desert Shield, Iraq used foreign hostages as human 
shields. Iraq deliberately placed SCUD infrastructure and facilities near their 
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own civilian population centers. Their plan was to use their own civilians as 
a shield against Coalition air strikes. By increasing the possibility of civilian 
casualties, Iraq hoped to limit U.S. and Coalition air attacks on their SCUD 
facilities. 
H. IRAQI SCUD MISSil..E EFFECTIVENESS 
From a military standpoint, the Al Hussein and the Al Abbas missiles 
were inaccurate and ineffective. They were modified by Iraq for use as a terror 
weapon against civilian targets. The two tons of missile and warhead falling 
on a city at 3,000 miles per hour is terrifying and lethal to the civilian 
population (Lennox, 1991, p. 302). Iraqi missile modifications increased the 
range of the SCUDs to enable them to target cities. These modifications, 
however, further reduced the accuracy of the modified SCUDs. Their accuracy 
was reduced because the guidance systems were not improved to compensate 
for the extended range. 
Iraq modified its SCUDs to use as terror weapons against cities. During 
the Iran-Iraq War, Iranian troop concentrations and other militarily targets were 
within the range of Iraqi SCUD Bs. If Iraq wanted to attack military targets 
with its SCUD Bs, modifications to the guidance system to reduce the CEP 
would have given Iraq that capability. (Ficken, 1992, pp. 4-5) Instead, it chose 
to increase the missile's range to be able to strike Tehran, a militarily 
insignificant target. 
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Additionally, Iraq was the only Middle Eastern country that had a 
credible long- range aerial strike capability. Iraqi planes routinely bombed 
civilian population centers and infrastructure instead of concentrating on 
military targets. These civilian targets included transportation, petroleum 
production and refining, and industrial facilities. (Eisenstadt, 1990, p. 24) 
Approximately eighty-eight total SCUDs were launched. Fifty-five were 
launched at Israel. Thirty-three were launched at Saudi Arabia. (Lennox, 1991, 
p. 302) 
DATES #DAYS SAUDI ARABIA ISRAEL TOTAL 
18-25 January 8 26 24 50 
26 January - 6 10 2 25 27 
February 
7 - 15 10 5 6 11 
February 
TOTALS 28 33 55 88 
-
Table 2. Iraqi SCUD Launches (Lennox, 1991, p. 302) 
In Israel, 10,476 apartments were damaged. There were 283 people 
injured and one death. The greatest single loss of life occurred in Saudi Arabia 
when a SCUD hit a warehouse used by the U.S. military as a barracks 
(Schneider and Fink, 1991, p. 13). Twenty-eight U.S. soldiers were killed and 
almost 100 were injured by a SCUD attack (Department of Defense, 1992, p. 
168). Despite the attempted interception by a Patriot missile battery, this attack 
caused the single greatest U.S. military loss of life during the entire war. While 
113 
the damage inflicted from the attacks was not great, they did cause civilians to 
flee the cities by the thousands (McNab, 1993, p. 23). However, the greatest 
fear of both the Israeli and Saudi populations never came to pass. Iraq did not 
employ chemical weapons against them. 
I. DEFENSES AGAINST SCUD MISSILES 
United States and Coalition active defense measures were limited to the 
deployment of Patriot air defense systems. The effectiveness of the systems 
was highly publicized during the war, possibly to calm the fears of Israel's and 
Saudi Arabia's threatened civilian populations. However, post-war reviews 
were less favorable of the systems performance. 61 The main reason the Patriot 
did not perform well against Iraqi SCUDs was it was not designed as an area 
anti-missile defense weapon. It was designed as a point anti-aircraft defense 
system to protect small militarily significant targets, not large cities. Its range, 
speed, altitude, and warhead were all designed to defeat high performance 
aircraft, not an incoming TM. Last minute modifications provided the Patriot 
some anti-missile capabilities. However, when a Patriot missile battery 
attempted to intercept an incoming SCUD, the SCUD separated during flight 
to increase accuracy. This separation produced two targets for the Patriot to 
intercept per missile. This two for one ratio assumes the SCUD body remains 
intact after warhead separation. The Patriots limited range and fragmentation 
61For additional information see Posto!, T., "Lessons of the Gulf War Experience with Patriot," International 
Security ,Vol 16 No 3, Winter 1991/92 pp. 119-171. 
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warhead could not destroy all incoming missile component fragments, including 
the warhead. 
Instead, Patriot missile detonations probably increased the diameter of 
the area where missile debris fell. Its own destruction could also increase the 
amount of debris that fell onto an area. This, in all likelihood, increased the 
amount of damage caused by the missiles. Reexamining Israeli damage figures 
demonstrates this. Approximately one half of the Iraqi SCUD missiles impacted 
before the Patriots were employed in Israel. The remaining half of the missile 
impacts occurred after the Patriots were operational. Before the Patriots 
became operational, the damage caused by incoming SCUDs was 2,698 
apartments damaged and 115 people injured. After the Patriots were 
operational, the damage caused by incoming missiles was, 7, 778 apartments 
damaged, 168 people injured, and one death. (Hughes in Fink, 1992, p. 12) 
#MISSILE APARTMENTS INJURIES DEATHS 
IMPACTS DAMAGED 
BEFORE 13 2,698 115 0 
OPERATIONA 
L 
AFTER 11 7,778 168 1 
OPERATIONA 
L 
Table 3. Patriot Effectiveness. (Hughes in Fink, 1992, p. 12) 
Passive defensive measures included attempts at timely missile launch 
warnings to military and civilian personnel. These attempts demonstrate the 
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difficulty integrating and disseminating U. S. national warning capabilities into 
a theater of operations to military units and cities. Civil defense measures and 
procedures were implemented and followed. Fear of chemical weapons may 
have helped in civil defense implementation. Passive defensive measures are 
a fundamental part of military training and preparedness. However, even those 
measures are not effective against direct hits. 
J. COAUTION INTERDICTION EFFORTS 
Looking back, it is apparent a shortfall occurred during Exercise Internal. 
Look 90. That exercise was conducted in July 1990. It was the first exercise 
conducted in which the Persian Gulf aggressor· state was Iraq and not Iran. 
While changing the exercise aggressor proved invaluable while executing 
Operation Desert Shield, it did not help the Central Command Air Force 
Component (CENTAF) planners prepare CONPLANs for targeting SCUDs and 
nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) facilities (Keaney and Cohen, 1993, p. 
31-32). Ultimately, two separate, but somewhat coordinated, campaigns were 
employed against the Iraqi SCUDs. The first was the air campaign with all its 
extensive planning and preparations. The second was a SOF campaign. After 
a shaky start, efforts were made to coordinate and integrate the two campaigns. 
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1. The Coalition Air Campaign 
The CENT AF and CIN C planning shortfall occurred despite four 
important factors. 62 First, Iraq had extensively used SCUDs against civilian 
targets in Iran to affect the outcome of that war. Second, prior to the invasion 
of Kuwait, the White House made public statements directed at Iraq after it had 
moved SCUDs into positions capable of striking Israel. Third, the theater CINC 
heard the President express concerns about the use of SCUDs against Israel. 
General Schwarzkopf had been present at that briefing. Finally, since 1973 all 
uses of TMs, both in interstate and internal conflicts, had occurred in the 
Middle East or North Africa. 
This initial failure was not corrected during the months of planning 
before the air campaign began. This failure to anticipate the use of SCUDs 
against Israel forced General Schwarzkopf to reprioritize the air war against 
Iraq. Had the air forces not been able to gain immediate air superiority and 
divert a significant portion of air assets against the SCUD threat, the 
spectacular victory with minimal losses might not have been achieved. 
According to Keaney and Cohen: 
The planners in the Black Hole, like CENTCOM's leaders, 
regarded Iraqi ballistic missiles (even with chemical warheads) 
chiefly as nuisance weapons that might cause political difficulties 
for the alliance (particularly if Israel were to retaliate against 
Iraqis). They viewed the missiles as posing little tactical or 
operational threat to the Coalition and intended to reduce the 
62'fhe Central Command Air Force Component (CENT AF) created a secret planning cell known as the Black 
Hole. It consisted primarily of USAF officers. Later, it was expanded to include representatives from the other 
U.S. services and British and Saudi representatives as well. (Keaney and Cohen, 1993, p. 31) 
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offensive threat they represented by attacking fixed launch sites, 
support bases, production facilities, potential hide sites, and 
support facilities for mobile launchers, but not the launchers 
themselves. (Keaney and Cohen, 1993, p. 43, parentheses added) 
The first night of the air war, the Black Hole did plan for and implement 
air strikes against fixed SCUD missile infrastructure. Unfortunately, their 
concentration on fixed strategic facilities did not degrade Iraq's ability to launch 
SCUD missiles. Again according to Kennedy and Cohen: 
When Desert Storm began, Coalition planners appear to have 
assumed that the Iraqis would launch their ballistic missiles 
initially from fixed or known launch· sites, giving Coalition air 
power a reasonable chance of eliminating the SCUD threat-or 
most of it-in the opening hours of the war. If the Iraqis did shift 
to mobile operations under attack, Coalition planners assumed 
that their setup and launch procedures would resemble those 
utilized by Soviet SCUD units in Europe. More specifically, the 
mobile launchers would not only require several hours to launch 
a missile but, in the process, provide distinctive signatures that 
Coalition forces could exploit to locate and attack them. Planners 
also assumed that decoys and other "background noise" would not 
greatly complicate the problem of dealing with Iraqi SCUD units. 
(Keaney and Cohen, 1993, p. 43) 
In all fairness to the Black Hole, they had identified SCUDs as one of 
eight strategic core target categories. These eight categories contained 295 
targets attacked on 15 January 1995. Of those at least thirteen targets were 
SCUD related. Fixed Iraqi SCUD facilities were attacked beginning on the first 
night of the war. These eight target categories were allocated fifteen percent 
of all Coalition air strikes. Those fifteen percent of the allocated air strikes 
employed a disproportionate thirty percent of all precision guided munitions 
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expended. (Keaney and Cohen, 1993, pp. 12, 42 and 64-65) Had the political 
stakes not been so great, had Iraq not had a history of strategic employment of 
SCUDs, had Iraq not recently maneuvered its SCUDs into threatening positions 
against Israel, and had the Middle East not had a history of missile use, the 
Black Hole's planning assumptions could have seemed appropriate. 
The campaign against the SCUDs had many facets. Satellites detected 
missile launches and sent six minute warnings to civilians and military units in 
the theater of operations. From intelligence, SCUD boxes were identified to 
narrow down the area that aircraft had to search for the mobile missiles. 
Strategic bombing attacks were targeted against production and storage 
facilities and other related infrastructure. At the tactical level, A-10 
Thunderbolt II attack aircraft, F-15E Eagle dual role fighters, and F-16 Fighting 
Falcon multi-role aircraft conducted attack operations against SCUDs. (Powell, 
April 1992, p. 50) 
The A-10 is the USAFs primary close air support (CAS) aircraft. It was 
designed as a low altitude tank killer. Their slow speed and long loiter time 
over their target area made them exceptionally suited for counter SCUD hunter 
operations in daytime. The F-15E Eagle dual role fighters were equipped with 
Low-Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared for Night (IANTIRN). This 
navigation and target designation equipment made the F-15E the most effective 
night capable ground attack aircraft. The F-16 Fighting Falcon multi-role 
aircraft was also used in counter SCUD operations. Modifications for the F-16s 
use of IANTIRN equipment were not completed before the start of the war. 
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This limited the F-16's nighttime effectiveness against SCUDs. (Department of 
Defense, 1992, pp. 664, 665, and 694-698) 
In an attempt to limit the effectiveness of U.S. reconnaissance and strike 
aircraft, Iraq installed and camouflaged antiaircraft weapons and radars in the 
areas surrounding SCUD launch sites. By eliminating Soviet peacetime safety 
procedures, the Iraqi TEL.s could depart the launch site minutes after launch 
(Department of Defense, April 1992, p. 167). To limit the effectiveness of Iraq's 
defenses, aircraft attempting to interdict SCUD launches were required to fly 
at high altitudes. The high altitudes limited the aircraft's ability to detect small, 
well-camouflaged SCUD TEL.s. An aircraft must find its target before it can 
destroy it. 
Another means of detecting SCUDs involved employing a prototype 
aircraft. Two E-8A Joint Sutveillance and Target Attack Radar System (J-
STARS) aircraft were rushed from development testing into combat 
employment during the war. These aircraft, with powerful side-looking ground 
swveillance radar, were supposed to be able to locate targets on the ground. 
(Powell, April 1992, p. 50) Because there were only two aircraft available, the 
J-STARS aircraft could not provide the continuous twenty-four-hour theater 
wide coverage necessary. They were used in counter SCUD operations. Their 
mission was to detect mobile SCUDs and direct attack aircraft onto the target. 
The J-STARS aircraft did detect vehicular movement in western Iraq. It was 
able to assist aircraft in attacking those vehicles. However, J-STARS could not 
identify types of vehicles, only their movement. Unless detailed TEL signatures 
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can be developed prior to the start of hostilities, a J-STARS aircraft may be 
better suited for post-launch detection and tracking of TELs. 
A third interdiction technique involved aircraft deploying area denial 
mines on suspected launch areas. (Department of Defense, 1992, p. 168) The 
intent behind this tactic was to restrict the number of possible SCUD launch 
sights. 63 Reducing the mobility of the TEL decreased the size of the search 
area. Reducing the size of SCUD boxes increased the concentration of 
Coalition assets and increased the chances of detecting SCUDs. 
After only planning for approximately 295 SCUD related targets, 1,460 
strikes were directed against SCUDs. Despite this massive air effort, there have 
been no confirmed SCUDs or TELs destroyed (Department of Defense, 1992, 
p. 168). All reported SCUD kills were either a misidentified vehicle or they were 
Iraqi SCUD TEL decoys. 
Because of their failure to destroy SCUD TELs, the USAF decided to use 
a less demeaning measure of success. They decided to do what the did in 
World War II when they could not stop V-1 and V-2 launches. The Air Force 
determined that interdiction, the possible decreased number of SCUD 
launching, was an acceptable measure of success. (Powell, April 1992, p. 51) 
Despite the Coalition's inability to stop SCUD launches their efforts did 
keep Israel out of the war. Publicity behind the apparently successful Patriot 
~he CBU-89 area denial mines have time delayed self-destruct mechanisms built into them. After a preset 
time, they automatically explode. This significantly reduces the possibility that civilians will be hurt by the mines 
after hostilities cease. 
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interdictions and SCUD hunting operations demonstrated to the civilian 
population that all available efforts were being used to protect them. 
2. The Special Operations Force Ground Campaign 
Most information on U.S. SOF operations against SCUDs is classified. 
However, U.S. and British SOF units were involved in counter SCUD 
operations. General Schwarzkopf mentions that special operations teams went 
deep into Iraq to watch the roads and report sightings of mobile launchers 
(Schwarzkopf, 1992, p. 418). There is one mention of U.S. SOF involvement in 
operations against SCUD missiles in the 824 page Department of Defense 
Report on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War. It states that a key element in 
the counter SCUD effort was small SOF elements on the ground who provided 
vital information about SCUDs (Department of Defense, 1992, p. 168). 
Several techniques were used by Coalition forces to hunt SCUD TELs. 
One technique involved establishing a "'fusion cell' of A-10 Thunderbolts, Delta 
Force and British Special Air Service (SAS) commandos to paint mobile 
launchers with laser target designators and call in air strikes" (Olson, 1991, p. 
4). A second technique involved using the best intelligence available to narrow 
down the search area into SCUD boxes. Coalition air assets were concentrated 
into these boxes (Department of Defense, 1992, p. 168). It would be reasonable 
to expect that Coalition SOF were deployed into these boxes as well to assist 
in locating, target acquisition, and interdiction of SCUD TELs. 
122 
i 
At least one British Special Air Service (SAS) patrol received a two-part 
counter SCUD mission. First, the team's mission was to locate and destroy 
landlines, including fiber optic lines, believed to be carrying information from 
Baghdad to the SCUD units. Second, the team was to find and destroy SCUDs. 
This mission was planned and executed after the Iraqi had begun launching 
SCUDs at Israel. (McNab, 1993, pp. 24, 5, and 23) This mission was part of the 
effort to prevent Israel from retaliating against Iraq and endangering the U.S. 
backed Coalition. 
In preparing for their mission, the small SAS team evaluated three means 
of infiltration into the western desert area of the Iraqi desert. The means of 
infiltration included driving hundreds of miles overland into their area of 
operation (AO), inserting by helicopter near their AO and walking the rest of 
the way in, or inserting directly into their AO. The team also evaluated two 
means of operating in the desert. One means of operation involved using 
vehicles. The second means was to operate on foot (McNab, 1993, pp. 28-33). 
Ultimately, the way the team chose to operate dictated their means of 
infiltration. 
The advantage of operating by vehicle was they would have more speed 
and firepower in an emergency. The disadvantage was the terrain in their AO. 
It would require continued hiding the vehicles every time the team came close 
to a potential target. Hiding the vehicles also meant leaving someone from 
their already small team behind with the vehicles to secure them. The long 
overland infiltration, overland exfiltration, and extended duration of their 
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mission also concerned the team. The team worried about carrying sufficient 
fuel to operate the vehicles the entire time. 
Operating by foot had the advantage of making concealment in the flat, 
barren desert easier for the eight man team. Infiltrating by helicopter into or 
near the AO was quicker. The faster means of infiltration could possibly put 
the team into position to execute their mission days earlier. The disadvantage 
was the slow rate of movement, limited firepower, and enormous weight of 
equipment each man had to initially carry. These restrictions would seriously 
reduce the team's chances of sutvival if detected. The team decided to go in on 
foot. 
The team determined they had two means of attacking and destroying 
a SCUD. First, they could call in an air strike. The team's concern was that 
they could be located by radio direction finding equipment if they called in 
aircraft. They decided that if they located a concentration of SCUD missiles 
and launchers, they would take the risk of compromise. Otherwise, they would 
attack an isolated SCUD TEL themselves. 
To prevent a SCUD from being launched, the team had three options. 
First, it could eliminate the launch crew. The advantage of a stand off precision 
sniper attack is that it would prevent the launch with minimum risk to the 
team. The disadvantage is that the missile and TEL might still be operational. 
Because of the volatility of the fuel, attacking the missile itself could produce 
catastrophic detonation, explosion of the missile fuel and warhead. If it was a 
chemical warhead, its detonation would endanger the team. The explosion 
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would also alert any enemy forces within a wide radius. The third alternative 
was to destroy or disable the TEL. This could be done by infiltrating up to the 
TEL, quietly eliminating the crew, and planting a small booby trapped time 
delayed explosive in the command center located in the middle of the TEL. 
Because the command center was shielded to protect the launch crew, the team 
determined that the explosion was unlikely to cause damage to the missile. 
Destroying the TEL prevented it from launching any other missiles. The time 
delay allowed the team to leave the area before the small detonation could alert 
any enemy forces. 
This SAS team decided to insert into the AO by helicopter and travel on 
foot. They were compromised and unable to complete either part of their 
mission. How other British and American SOF forces preformed is unknown. 
There is no information available to confirm any SCUDs were destroyed by 
SOF forces. 
K. THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMil IEE 
Accurate information was not available on Iraq's SCUD program until 
after the war. The United Nations Special Committee (UNSCOM) sent 
inspectors to investigate Iraq's WMD and missile programs. Besides collecting 
information, the UNSCOM inspectors located and destroyed Iraqi SCUDs 
(McCarthy, 1995). The missiles destroyed by the U.N. inspectors are the only 
ones that can be confirmed. 
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L. CONCLUSION 
The Soviet strategy of Maskirovoka, deception and disinformation, was 
at the heart of Iraqi SCUD missile employment techniques. Despite the best 
efforts of U.S. and Coalition air and SOF assets, there is no confirmation of a 
single SCUD or TEL destroyed during the entire war (Department of Defense, 
1992, p. 168). It took the deployment of UNSCOM inspectors on the ground 
in Iraq after the war to track down and destroy the Iraqi SCUDs. Coalition 
interdiction efforts did appear to have some effect on the Iraqi employment of 
SCUD missiles. However, it was primarily the limited number of SCUD TELs 
available and the accuracy of the modified SCUD missiles that limited the 
effectiveness of the Iraqi missiles. 
After the Persian Gulf War, the Department of Defense completed a 
major report to Congress. The U.S. Air Force also conducted another Air 
Power Report similar to the Strategic Bombing Survey it completed for World 
War Il. Despite the failure of strategic and tactical bombing efforts of the U.S. 
and Coalition Air Forces, the survey again determined that air interdiction 
efforts were successful. This standard of success was again defined as delaying 
employment of and degrading the launch capabilities of Iraqi SCUDs. This was 
the same low standard of success developed to validate the concept of strategic 
and tactical air bombing against German V weapons in World War Il. 
Accepting this low standard of success prevents the U.S. military from 
learning from its past mistakes and moving forward with joint service efforts 
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to conduct effective, coordinated attacks against TMs. The creation of the 
"fusion cell" by CENTCOM clearly indicates there was a lack of joint doctrine 
and JTTPs in existence during the Persian Gulf War to combat SCUDs. Since 
then, some progress has been made in developing JTMD doctrine. Little 
progress has been made developing JTMD JTTPs. 
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VI. -THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 
The U.S. Air Force planned a 500-sortie air strike against Soviet TMs, 
bombers, and their supporting infrastructure located in Cuba (Garthoff, 1989, 
pp.50, 53, and 150). The Air Force repositioned nearly a thousand aircraft 
within striking distance of Cuba (Blight and Welch, 1989, p. 3). However, 
because of uncertainties with Air Force bombing capabilities and possible 
intelligence shortfalls, a massive air attack could not provide a one hundred 
percent guarantee that Soviet TM launchers, missiles, and short- range bombers 
positioned in Cuba would be destroyed. To ensure destruction of the Soviet 
weapons, it was determined that a ground force would have to invade and 
occupy the Soviet facilities. Only an invasion and occupation of the launch 
sites and storage sites could ensure the destruction of the missiles and prevent 
other missiles from being emplaced there in the future. 
This section analyzes the 1962 Soviet employment of medium-range 
ballistic missiles (MRBMs) and intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) in 
Cuba. United States defense efforts against the Soviet missiles are examined. 
This is the only case available that involves the employment of TMs possibly 
armed with WMDs that threatened U.S. vital interests.64 It is the best 
documented case where the United States planned attack operations against 
TMs possibly armed with WMDs. Despite the U.S. Air Force claim of being 
&tfhe Soviet missiles fall within the range limits of this thesis' definition of TM. The MRBMs had a range of 
1,000 miles. The IRBMs had a range of 2,500 miles. Neither was designed to strike targets in the United States. 
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capable of conducting precision bombing strikes, they were unable to 
guarantee success in eliminating Soviet TM launch sites in Cuba. The success 
of the Air Force plan was uncertain, even though Soviet forces in Cuba failed 
to camouflage their missile emplacements. 
A. DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET MISSILES IN CUBA 
Beginning as early as 2 January 1961, Khrushchev denounced personally 
any idea that the Soviet Union would put missile bases in Cuba. After the Bay 
of Pigs incident in April 1962, Khrushchev sent a note to President Kennedy 
saying the Soviets would not put .missiles into Cuba (Abel, 1966, pp. 15-16). 
Additionally, until the Cuban Missile Crisis, it had been Soviet policy to not 
deploy nuclear missiles outside the borders of their country (Allison, 1970, p. 
14). The Kennedy Administration was aware of this policy.65 Except for the 
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, no high-level Executive Official 
believed Soviet missiles in Cuba was even a remote possibility. (Abel, 1966, p. 
18) 
In July 1962, Khrushchev met in Moscow with Castro's brother Raul, the 
Cuban Defense Minister. Shortly afterwards, the Soviets significantly increased 
the number of ships carrying military supplies to Cuba from the Baltic and 
Black Seas. Several of the ships off loading in Cuba were designed to carry 
650ne reason the Soviets never deployed nuclear missiles outside their own borders was for their own security. 
If Soviet missiles placed in any European satellite country fell under the control of anti-Soviet factions, Moscow 
and other major Soviet cities could be threatened with their own missiles. If MRBMs and IRBMs missiles were 
placed in Cuba, the Soviet Union could not be placed in danger if they lost control of their own missiles. The 
missiles did not have the capability to reach targets in the Soviet Union. (Abel, 1966, p. 18) 
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large bulky items. The ships had oversized hatches suitable for shipping large 
oversized items. These ships also rode high in the water, as though they were 
loaded with lightweight, bulky items. Despite the increase in shipments of 
military supplies to Cuba, the White House remained unconcerned. The Soviet 
doctrine of Maskirovoka, deception and disinformation, was successfully 
employed by senior Soviet leaders against U.S. policy makers. 
Fortunately, for the United States, Soviet military forces in Cuba failed 
to employ Maskirovoka. Basic concealment and security measures were not 
used. It was reported to the CIA that Cubans living near the deep water port 
of Mariel had been forced to evacuate their homes. Russians were now 
guarding the port. Russians were unloading cargo from ships coming from the 
Soviet Union. The CIA also began to receive multiple reports of large rocket 
components being transported from Mariel by road. (Abel, 1966, pp. 21-25) 
Reconnaissance flights along the coast of Cuba showed evidence of 
surface to air missile (SAM) site construction. The Soviets made no attempt to 
camouflage the sites. At first, it was believed that the construction was just for 
Cuban defense. Then it was noticed that the trapezoidal employment pattern 
of the SAMs was the same as the trapezoidal employment pattern of SAMs 
around missile emplacements inside the Soviet Union. Because of these 
observations, aerial surveillance near the town of San Cristobal was conducted. 
The next day the United States had photographic evidence of Soviet missile 
launchers and infrastructure construction in Cuba. (Abel, 1966, pp. 26-29) 
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B. SOVIET MISSILE CHARACTERISTICS 
While Soviet MRBMs and IRBMs had different maximum ranges, 
permanent launch sites were being constructed in Cuba for both types of 
missiles. This case study emphasizes the MRBMs because they were the only 
missiles that could have become operational during the crisis. 
I. Soviet Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles 
The Soviet SS-4 MRBM was a liquid-fueled rocket with a range of 1,000 
miles. It could strike targets on the Gulf and Atlantic Coasts, including 
Washington, D.C. (Abel, 1966, p. 59). The SS-4 was a 'mobile' missile system. 
It was as mobile in the same way as a house being lifted off its foundation and 
moved by truck is mobile. The SS-4 launcher normally deployed with two 
missiles. It could be reloaded and a second missile launched from the same 
launcher (Schlesinger, 1965, p. 796). The SS-4's weakness was its unstable 
fuel. Because of the fuel's instability, the rocket could only be placed on alert 
for a maximum of five hours. After that, the fuel had to be removed (Blight 
and Welch, 1989, pp. 210-211). 
United States intelligence agencies determined that the SS-4 was an 
effective first strike weapon, but that it was incapable of surviving a preemptive 
counter attack (Allison, 1970, p. 29). There were three possible reasons for the 
missile's vulnerability. First, because of the fueling process, warhead mating 
process and countdown, the fastest estimated launch time was eight hours 
(Blight and Welch, 1989, pp. 210-211). Second, the SS-4 required 
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approximately twenty men to be fired (Jane's Weapons Systems 1987-88 in 
Blight and Welch, 1989, p. 350). It is reasonable to assume that minor 
setvicing, including the cleaning or flushing of the fuel tanks, would be 
required before new fuel could be reloaded into a missile and it could go back 
on alert. Finally, while the SS-4's mobility made U.S. Air Force targeting efforts 
more difficult, the Soviet's initial failure to camouflage the SS-4's launch sites 
gave U.S. intelligence agencies and the Air Force the opportunity to overcome 
this advantage. 
2. Soviet Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles 
The Soviet SS-5 IRBM had a range of 2,500 miles. ~o achieve this range, 
the SS-5 was large, complicated, and required too much support to be mobile. 
The SS-5 was designed for firing from permanent launch sites (Blight and 
Welch, 1989, pp. 210-211). The SS-5 could strike targets as far west as 
Wyoming and Montana (Abel, 1966, p. 59). 
3. Mobility 
Mobility was not designed into Soviet MRBMs and IRBMs. While the SS-
4 had limited mobility, it could not be transported and launched from a TEL 
like modem SS-24 and SS-25 ICBMs. There was no indication that more than 
one launch site was prepared for each SS-4 launcher. Mobility was not a 
critical design factor for their MRBMs and IRBMs. Soviet doctrine did not 
include the deployment of MRBMs and IRBMs outside the borders of the Soviet 
Union. The limited mobility of the SS-4, however, did cause significant 
133 
concerns for U.S. policy makers. They were concerned that the Soviets would 
attempt to reposition the SS-4s during the crisis. Repositioning would have 
made the missiles more difficult to destroy. 
4. Ease of Concealment 
The Soviets concealed their missiles during transport. However, Soviet 
military forces in Cuba failed to camouflage the missile launch site and 
infrastructure construction and missiles. During the crisis, the Soviets did start 
to camouflage their sites. This also concerned U.S. policy makers because it 
could make the sites more difficult to destroy (Graham, 1970, p. 33). The crisis 
was resolved before camouflaging was completed. 
The Soviets made two errors concerning the use of camouflage while 
employing missiles in Cuba. First, they did not camouflage their SAM 
emplacements. The Soviets should have been aware of U.S. photo 
reconnaissance capabilities.66 The error in failing to camouflage the SAMs was 
compounded by employing the SAMs in the same trapezoidal configuration as 
was used in employing SAMs around missile sites inside the Soviet Union. 
Second, and even worse, was the Soviet military's failure to camouflage 
the MRBMs and IRBMs, their launch sites, and supporting infrastructure. Had 
it not been for the lack of camouflage at the air defense and TM construction 
S&fhere are two possible reasons for not camouflaging the sites. First, by not camouflaging the SAM sights, 
the U.S. might overlook any reports of missile activity on Cuba if they were aware that SAMs were being 
emplaced. Second, the Soviets may have underestimated U.S. aerial reconnaissance capabilities. Reconnaissance 
aircraft had already been shot down over the Soviet Union and China. Also, the U.S. was not directly over flying 
Cuba prior to the introduction of the missiles by the Soviets. The U-2s were flying off the coast at an altitude of 
fourteen miles. Their cameras were looking inland. This flight pattern and weather conditions over the island 
significantly limited the U-2's photo reconnaissance capability. (Abel, 1966, p. 26) 
134 
sites, the United States might not have confirmed the presence of Soviet 
missiles in Cuba until the SS-4s were operational. 
5. Ease of Maintenance and Resupply 
By today's standards, the Soviet MRBM and IRBM missiles placed in 
Cuba were not easy to maintain and resupply. During the crisis, the eight-hour 
prelaunch preparation time and five hour maximum alert time limited the SS-
4's effectiveness. Because of the SS-5's increased maintenance and support 
requirements, they were at least a month away from becoming operational. 
C. SOVIET MISSILE EMPLOYMENT TECHNIQUES 
The Soviet doctrine of Maskirovoka required the missile facilities in Cuba 
be established by using deception and disinformation. At the strategic level, 
Soviet efforts were successful. At the tactical level, their efforts failured. 
1. Deception 
The Soviet leadership used deception at the strategic level. They were 
successful in maintaining the secrecy and security of their TMs during 
shipment. The sudden surge in the shipment of materials to Cuba did not go 
unnoticed by the U.S. intelligence agencies. However, the missile shipments 
went not detected. The efforts of senior Soviet government officials and their 
pattern of not deploying nuclear missiles outside the Soviet Union, mislead U.S. 
policmakers. The reconnaissance flight, which discovered the MRBM sites, was 
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not initiated because of the increase in the volume of supplies coming into 
Cuba. It was initiated because of the detection of SAM sites. 
To ensure security, the Soviets attempted to limit the Cuban's knowledge 
of the missiles. Soviet military personnel were used to transport missiles and 
construct the launch sites and supporting infrastructure. Limiting the Cuban 
military's knowledge and access to the missiles turned out to be unnecessary 
and counterproductive. It was unnecessary because the reports that the CIA 
received from Cubans were considered unreliable until confirmed by other 
means. It was counterproductive to not involve the Cubans in missile 
construction operations because the assistance of the Cubans with construction 
and deception operations could have helped keep the presence of the Soviet 
missiles a secret. (Blight and Welch, 1989, pp. 297-299) 
2. Decoys 
There is no evidence that the Soviets employed decoys in Cuba during 
the crisis. The continued construction of the SS-5 launch sites is the closest the 
Soviets came to employing decoys. Although intelligence estimates indicated 
that the SS-5s would not be operational for at least a month, the continued 
construction of these sites caused the Air Force to target them also, rather then 
concentrate their firepower on the SS-4 sites. 
3. Dispersal 
The Soviets dispersed their missiles in four separate launch areas. There 
were: 
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eight to ten bases located in areas around Guanajay, Remedios, 
San Cristobal, and Sagua la Grande, each base having about four 
launchers ... Reports from all intelligence sources confirm that 
at least thirty missiles and more than twenty IL - 28 light jet 
bombers are present in Cuba. (A. Sylvester in Abel, 1966, p. 153) 
By dispersing the launch sites, the number of combat sorties necessary to 
attack the missile, launch sites, and infrastructure had to be increased. 
Attacking multiple targets simultaneously also increases command, control, and 
communications (C3) problems. 
4. Using Civilians as Shields 
By dispersing the launch sites as they did, the Soviets used Cuban 
civilians as shields. One civilian casualty figure used by Robert Kennedy in a 
speech in 1964 indicated that as many as 25,000 civilians could have been killed 
if the missile launch sites and SAM sites had been attacked by air (Abel, 1966, 
p. 64). 67 American policy makers were concerned about the domestic and 
international impact resulting from Cuban civilian casualties resulting from a 
preemptive U.S. air strike on Soviet missiles in Cuba. A large number of 
civilian casualties would have had a negative impact. 
D. SOVJET MISSILE EMPLOYMENT EFFECTIVENESS 
Despite their lack of tactical camouflage, the Soviets still deployed their 
SAMs and missiles. Only forty-two of the SS-4 MRBMs were deployed into 
67\Vithout further information on how the casualty figures were determined, it is possible that an unusually 
high casualty figure was used for purely political reasons. 
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Cuba. They were emplaced in six sites, four sites at San Cristobal and two sites 
at Sagua la Grande. There were four launchers at each site. This meant that 
there were twenty-four primary targets, the missile launchers, for the U.S. Air 
Force. The Soviets normally deployed two missiles per launcher.68 During the 
crisis, the construction and preparations around the SS-4 sites indicated they 
were rapidly becoming operational (Blight and Welch, 1989, pp. 210 and 350). 
As early as 18 October, intelligence reports indicated the SS-4s could be ready 
for launch within eighteen hours (Abel, 1966, p. 71). 
The Soviet SS-5 IRBMs were not even close to becoming operational 
during the crisis. 69 Because of their larger size and increased range, the SS-5s 
required larger, permanent launch site facilities. Sixteen IRBM launch sites 
were identified (Schlesinger, 1965, p. 796). Even at the height of the crisis, 
intelligence reports indicated that at least one month more was required before 
the SS-5s would be operational. 
Even the attempts to camouflage the SAM and MRBM sites after 
discovery increased those sites chances of survival in the event of an air attack. 
If U.S. pilots knew the exact location of the launch sights on their maps, those 
sites still had to be located by the individual pilots during an attack. In the heat 
of battle, traveling at high speeds with SAM missiles and other antiaircraft 
68J:t is believed that the last six SS-4s were on board the Soviet ships that returned to Soviet ports and did not 
attempt to cross the quarantine (Schlesinger, 1965, p. 796) The sixteen SS-5 IRBMs were believed to also be on 
board the same ships. (Blight and Welch, 1989, p. 350) 
~t is believed that the SS-5 missiles were enroute to Cuba when the quarantine was announced. Several of 
the ships that turned back for their Soviet ports were similar in design to the ships that were believed to have 
transported the SS-4 MRBMs into Cuba. 
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weapons firing at them, -the pilots would have had difficulty pinpointing and 
destroying each individual launcher. 
E. DEFENSE MEASURES 
Before the United States announced the presence of the Soviet missiles 
in Cuba, defensive measures were taken. Air defense facilities were stripped 
from places outside the range of the MRBMs positioned in Cuba and 
repositioned in the southeastern United States (Schlesinger, 1965, p. 803). 
Sixty-nine of the 850 Air Force aircraft repositioned to air bases in Florida were 
interceptor aircraft (Blight and Welch, 1989, p. 210). Their mission was to 
defend the United States from attack by Soviet aircraft positioned in Cuba. The 
additional interceptors augmented other intercepter units permanently based 
in Florida to defend the continental United States. 
F. INTERDICTION PIANS 
Of all the plans examined by the President and his advisors, only two 
involved the destruction of the missiles. All of the other diplomatic options, 
includingthe Naval quarantine, were designed to apply pressure on the Soviets 
and force them to withdraw their missiles. The two options for destroying the 
Soviet MRBM missiles in Cuba were an air strike and/or an invasion. 
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1. The Attack Operation Plan 
The USAF Tactical Air Command (TAC) had responsibility for planning 
the air strike. The TAC developed a plan that required 500 aircraft sorties to 
execute the air strike. 70 Even with that tremendous number of aircraft, the Air 
Force could not guarantee the destruction of all of the Soviet missiles. There 
are two reasons behind the Air Force's inability to guarantee the destruction. 
First, the Air Force did not have a truly precision bombing capability. Second, 
the Air Force believed that it could not rely on the intelligence agencies to 
locate and identify every missile launcher in Cuba. 
General Sweeney, the commander of the TAC stated "he was certain that 
the air strike would be 'successful'; however even under optimal conditions, it 
was not likely that all of the known missiles would be destroyed." General 
Sweeney also said that "the known missiles are probably no more than 60% of 
the total missiles on the island.". (Blight and Welch, 1989, p. 349) 
General Maxwell Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated 
"the best we can offer you is to destroy 90% of the known missiles" (Blight and 
Welch, 1989, p. 349). To understand the complicated air strike plan, one must 
first understand the priority of importance of the various types of targets that 
had to be attacked. 
First, there were twenty-four primary targets, the SS-4 MRBM launchers. 
Guarding the sites was five SA-2 SAM sites, out of a total of twenty-four total 
7
°A sortie is one flight by one aircraft (Office of the Chairman, Joint Pub 1-02, 1994, p. 349). Two sorties 
could be flown by two aircraft, each flying one mission, or by one aircraft flying two mission back to back. 
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sites in Cuba. There were also three airfields with thirty-nine Soviet MIG-21 
interceptors. The SS-5 IRBM launch sites under construction were also 
identified for attack. (Blight and Welch, 1989, p. 210) The MIG-21 aircraft 
posed a significant threat. 
Before attacking the missile sites, the air defenses had to be suppressed 
or destroyed. The original plan called for eight aircraft to attack each of the 
five SAM sites. This required a total of forty strike aircraft. Twelve aircraft 
were to attack each of the three airfields where the MIG-2 ls were located. This 
required a total of thirty-six aircraft. Other aircraft were dedicated to intercept 
any aircraft that took off from the airfield. In total, one hundred aircraft were 
assigned to suppress or destroy Soviet air-defenses in Cuba. (Blight and Welch, 
1989, p. 210) 
To eliminate the missile threat, twenty-four MRBM sites and between 
eight and twelve IRBM sites were identified for attack. 71 The plan required six 
aircraft to attack each launcher. That required a total of 216 aircraft. In all, 
250 aircraft were identified to attack the launchers (Blight and Welch, 1889, p. 
210). This figure allows for redundancy in the event of aircraft losses due to 
maintenance or combat action prior to the actual attack. Finally, one hundred 
fifty aircraft were identified to attack the IL-28 bombers and their airfields. This 
brought the total requirement to 500 aircraft sorties (Blight and Welch, 1989, 
p. 210). The Air Force built a safety factor into their plan. There were twenty-
71The IRBM sites identified for bombing were the sites closest to completion. However, those were at least 
a month from completion. 
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four extra aircraft in the air defense suppression portion of the plan. There 
were thirty-four extra in the attack on the missile sites. Finally, using one 
hundred fifty aircraft against the bombers indicates extra aircraft were included 
in that portion of the attack as well. 
Besides the 500 sortie aircraft required to conduct the attack, the TAC 
positioned three hundred additional aircraft in Florida. This was an additional 
reserve equal to sixty percent of the strike force. If the attack against the IRBM 
sites was postponed, only 400 aircraft would have been required to execute the 
smaller plan. That meant that the Air Force had a one hundred percent 
reserve. (Blight and Welch, 1989, pp. 210-211) 
Despite all of the Air Forces plans and aircraft repositioning efforts, as 
late as 27 October, they still required at least thirty-six hours before they could 
commence an attack. In addition to the time required, the President did not 
believe the Air Force could execute the strike with the precision the Air Force 
claimed (Abel, 1966, pp. 194-195). Finally, the best advice available to the 
President indicated that even if the air attack was successful, meaning no 
missiles were immediately launched at the United States, an invasion of Cuba 
would be necessary within five or six days to prevent any further possibility of 
a launch (Abel, 1966, p. 194). 
2. The Invasion Plan 
Throughout the crisis, the President remained focused on the one reason 
that an invasion of Cuba was necessary. That reason was to guarantee the 
142 
elimination of the missile threat. An invasion would be necessary to ensure 
that no launchers could become operational and launched at the United States. 
Only the physical occupation of the missile launch sites and infrastructure 
could guarantee that. (Abel, 1966, pp. 193-195) 
Toward that aim, the Army assembled more than 100,000 troops in 
Florida and the southeast United States (Salinger, 1966, p. 269). A previously 
scheduled Navy-Marines amphibious exercise in the Caribbean was reinforced. 
It became a 40,000 strong marine landing force. There were also 5,000 marines 
stationed at Naval base at Guantanamo, Cuba. Fourteen thousand reservists 
were recalled. Their mission was to provide air transport if an airborne 
operation was necessary (Schlesinger, 1965, p. 803). 
G. CONCLUSION 
Unlike military leadership in World War II and the Persian Gulf War, the 
commander of the Air Force Tactical Air Command (f AC) and the Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not misjudge the political significance of possible 
Soviet MRBM attacks on American cities. The TAC easily had one hundred 
sixty percent of the air assets necessary to execute an air strike. A slight 
modification to their strike plan, not bombing the IRBM sites, would have given 
the TAC two' hundred percent of the assets necessary. Given this large number 
of extra aircraft, the capability of attacking each MRBM launcher with at least 
two waves of aircraft, and then having each wave reattack the sites after 
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rearming and refueling, it is amazing that the TAC commander did not 
guarantee the president that the Air Force could eliminate the Soviet TM threat. 
Unlike World War II and the Persian Gulf War, the political and military 
leaders understood that an air strike alone could not guarantee the destruction 
of the Soviet MRBM launchers. An invasion was necessary to occupy and 
ensure destruction of the launchers. Additionally, the potential political impact 
of Soviet missiles striking U.S. cities was enough to make the Air Force 
cautious with their estimate of the probability of success. 
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VII. EXERCISE ROVING SANDS 95 
Exercise Roving Sands 95 was the first exercise since the Persian Gulf 
to bring multi-service assets together in a TMD scenario. Participants included 
the Army, Air Force, and some limited Navy participation. Central Command 
(CENTCOM) and their Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT) 
headquarters also participated. Within the Army, active defense and attack 
operations forces, including attack and deep penetration helicopters and 
ATACMS, participated. Army Special Forces also participated in all aspects of 
the exercise. 
A. EXERCISE OBJECTIVES 
From 15April until 10May1995, U.S. military forces conducted Exercise 
Roving Sands 95. This exercise was the most widely known portion of a larger 
exercise and evaluation effort sponsored by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 
known as Joint Project/Exercise Optic Cobra. Besides Roving Sands 95, Optic 
Cobra included two other exercises: Special. Project Night Vector (SPNV) and 
an Advanced Warfighting Exercise (AWE). Night Victor was an "experiment 
that involved linking joint and national intelligence programs" (U.S. Army 
Operational Evaluation Command Briefing, 11 July 1995, slide 5). It also 
"integrated SOF into near-real-time information dissemination capabilities" 
(DeRobertis Briefing, 12 May 1995, slide 7). The AWE attempted "to develop 
a holistic operational concept for TMD that supports joint doctrine," develop 
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Army specific TTPs for TMD, and determine existing shortfalls in Army TMD 
capabilities from 1996-2001 (Cravens, 1995, p. 20). 
Roving Sands is an annual integrated air defense exercise. Central 
Command and SOCCENT participated in Roving Sands 95. Conventional Army 
reconnaissance and strike elements participated as well. These assets included 
attack and deep penetration helicopters and ATACMS. Special Operations 
Forces participated in all phases of Optic Cobra. 
B. ARMY EXERCISE ACCOMPLISHMENTS 
As a result of the Optic Cobra and Roving Sands 95 exercises, "the Army 
was able to prosecute deep targets and targets of opportunity as part of TMD 
operations" (TMD AWE Briefing, 12 May 1995, slide 21). Army AH-64 attack 
helicopters and ATACMS were able to engage TM targets. The duration of the 
ATACMS mission, or some portion of it, was measured in minutes. The 
duration of the AH-64 mission, from aircraft launch to return, averaged about 
three hours. The lessons learned dictated that the Army must enhance TTPs 
for attack operations against TMs (DeRobertis Briefing, 12 May 1995, slides 22-
25 and 41). 
C. ARMYSPECIALFORCESACCOMPUSHMENTS 
The 5th Special Forces (SF) Group, which is oriented to CENTCOM's 
southwest Asia theater of operations, was a principal participant in all aspects 
of Optic Cobra. The mission of the 5th SF Group was to provide support to 
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SOCCENT and theater CINC operations (USAJFKSWC Briefing, 1995, slides 3 
and 5). During the actual field exercise, SF operational detachments (ODAs) 
were deployed on the ground for approximately eight days. During that time, 
they were credited with identifying twenty-six TELs, twenty-five supply 
vehicles, two decoy targets, and at least thirteen other potential targets. Special 
Forces ODAs were also credited with conducting target location and acquisition 
tasks for an Air Force F-15E Eagle and Army deep penetration strike 
helicopters. Both missions were credited with exercise kills of TELs 
(DeRobertis Briefing, 1995, slides 2 and 7). 
This exercise is also credited with validating SOF1s doctrinal role in TMD 
as sensors and decision makers, BDA (i.e., post-strike reconnaissance), near-
real-time reporting, and an early entry force option (SOCCENT Briefing, 1995, 
slides 3, 14, and 17). The exercise is also credited with helping SOCCENT 
develop their TMD TIPs, providing SOF SR 'eyes on target,' demonstrating a 
SOF capability to conduct deep DA attacks on TM targets, and demonstrating 
that an SF element could be introduced early into a campaign and used 
effectively in attack operations against TMs (SOCCENT Briefing, 1995, slide 
17). 
The early introduction of SOF assets into a theater during conflict is 
important. It is important because the Army's draft TMD doctrine does not 
integrate SF into attack operations against TMs early in a campaign. Instead, 
they focus their initial TM strike force package around conventional strike 
assets, field artillery assets, attack helicopters, and active defense assets (U.S. 
147 
Army, 1995, pp. 5-7). Army SF demonstrated their capability to work with 
those assets. Army SF also demonstrated its capability to work with Air Force 
assets in a TMD scenario. This capability gives both the ground commander 
and theater CINC additional options in conducting attack operations against 
TMs. 
D. ROVING SANDS REEXAMINED 
The results reported from this exercise differ significantly from the 
results from the Persian Gulf War. During that war, no TELs were confirmed 
destroyed prior to or during launch. One reason for this wartime shortfall was 
a lack of intelligence on Iraqi SCUD capabilities. The lack of intelligence 
forced all Coalition assets, including SOF assets, to be spread over a wide area 
to locate and destroy SCUD TELs. Perhaps in Exercise Roving Sands 95, the 
available intelligence was better. Better intelligence would allow all assets, 
including SOF, to be focused on a smaller target area. As ASW doctrine 
indicates, the smaller the search area, the greater the chances of locating and 
destroying the target. 
Regardless of the exact number of targets identified and/or destroyed, 
this exercise indicates that the services have finally begun working together 
and with the theater CINCs in an attempt to improve JTMD capabilities. 
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VIII. THE ASSESSMENT OF OPERATIONS AGAINST THEATER 
MISSILES 
The case studies reveal that the United States has never destroyed TMs 
prior to or during launch operations. There are two reasons for this. One 
reason is joint service operations are inherently difficult to conduct. The other 
is the characteristics and employment techniques of the TMs make them 
difficult to target. Add into the attack operation equation the proliferation of 
TMs and WMDs and the capability to conduct operations against TMs becomes 
even more critical to U.S. national interests. 
One way to improve U.S. capabilities to conduct attack operations 
against TMs is to integrate SOF into JTMD doctrine and JTIPs. Special 
operations forces can conduct pre-strike reconnaissance, target acquisition 
tasks, post-strike reconnaissance/ BDA, and recovery of material that has 
political, military, intelligence, or environmental value. Integrating SOF into 
JTMD operations can be done quickly and provide an immediate payoff in 
increased capabilities. 
A. THEATER COMMANDERS AND JOINT SERVICE OPERATIONS 
Differences in the development and implementation of JTMD doctrine 
and JTIPs has hindered its development. Each service has the responsibility 
to develop doctrine, tactics, organize, train and equip forces for the use by the 
theater CINCs (Department of Defense Directive, 1987, p. 10). Each of the 
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eight theater CINCs has the responsibility for handling potential military crises, 
other military related requirements, and developing the strategic concepts, 
OPIANS, and CONPIANS for their regions. Meanwhile, USSOCOM manages 
its responsibility to develop doctrine, tactics, organize, train and equip all SOF 
elements. It must also integrate SOF into all aspects of joint doctrine, including 
JTMD. 
All three case studies demonstrated that no single service or asset has 
the capability to conduct successful attack operations against TMs. In World 
War II, air power could not stop TM launches against Allied cities. During the 
Persian Gulf War, again the Air Force could not stop TM launches. Special 
operations forces were not able to stop TM launches either. Even together, air 
assets and SOF could not stop TM launches. One reason was because JTMD 
doctrine and JTTPs did not exist. Finally, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the 
Air Force assembled nearly twice the force required to strike at Soviet launch 
sites in Cuba. Even with the excess capability, the Air Force could not 
guarantee the destruction of all Soviet launch sites. 
Ground forces have been the only forces capable of stopping the launch 
of TMs. However, it takes ground forces much more time to accomplish this 
mission. In World War II, ground forces had to reorient their direction of 
attack and overrun V-1 and V-2 launch sites. These operations took months to 
complete. Meanwhile, German V weapons continued to rain down on Allied 
cities. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, a massive Army airborne and 
Army/Marine invasion force was assembled. However, it would have taken 
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days for the forces to capture and secure the Soviet launch sites in Cuba. 
During that time, the United States would have been in danger of attack from 
Soviet TMs, possibly armed with WMDs, launched from those sites in Cuba. 
During the Persian Gulf War, an ad hoc effort was made to integrate Air 
Force and SOF elements to stop the launch of SCUDs against cities in Israel. 
Those efforts were unsuccessful, in part, because no doctrine or JTTPs existed 
for attack operations against TMs. Since the war, the services, theater CINCs, 
and USSOCOM have worked to develop JTMD doctrine. While the results from 
Roving Sands 95 appear to be too optimistic, they are still encouraging. Army 
SOF is beginning to prove that they can be the "eyes on target" necessary to 
increase JTMD attack operations capabilities. Besides providing pre- and post-
strike reconnaissance capabilities, SOF can assist in the destruction of TMs or 
recover critical material. 
Current JTMD doctrine and capabilities cannot protect U.S. assets and 
interests against TM attacks. Exercise Roving Sands 95 indicates the 
synergistic integration of SOF into JTMD doctrine and the development of 
JTTPs to implement JTMD doctrine has the capacity to improve U.S. military 
capabilities to defend against TMs. The TM threat cannot be ignored any 
longer. 
B. THE POLITICAL IMPACT OF THEATER MISSILES 
The political impact of TMs armed with conventional warheads has been 
greater than their military significance. In both World War II and the Persian 
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Gulf War, military leaders considered TM threats as militarily insignificant. 
The military leaders ignored the potential impact of TM attacks against 
civilians. When the public and politicians demanded an end to the TM attacks, 
the military had to quickly change plans and reallocate assets in an attempt to 
stop or reduce the attacks on the cities. 
The Cuban Missile Crisis and the Persian Gulf War present mixed signals 
concerning the military understanding of the political impact of TMs. During 
the Cuban Missile Crisis when U.S. cities were threatened, the military was 
cautious in their estimates of success in destroying Soviet missile launch sites 
in Cuba. During World War II and the Persian Gulf War when U.S. cities were 
not threatened, U.S. military leaders did not consider the political importance 
of TM attacks on friendly cities. 
During the Cuban Missile Crisis, the military had weeks to plan and 
implement defense measures and prepare for an air strike. Despite having 
between 160 percent and 200 percent of the air strike assets needed to attack 
the Soviet launch sites, infrastructure, and light bombers, no strike was 
recommended. Two military leaders, the commander of the Tactical Air Forces 
that would conduct the attack, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
both would only guarantee destruction of 90 percent of the targets. 72 In this 
case, the increased costs and risks calculations by the military overemphasized 
72More importantly, both military leaders were concerned that perhaps as much as 40 percent of the missile 
sites in Cuba had not even been discovered yet. Their concerns over potential intelligence shortfalls ultimately 
were unfounded. History has proved that this was one time when the intelligence was accurate and complete 
enough to identify all missile launch sites and storage facilities. 
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the political concerns and underestimated the military concerns. Militarily, the 
Soviet missiles in Cuba were insignificant. They would remain insignificant 
until they were armed, camouflaged, and in a potential alert status. That 
condition had not been reached. Until then, with 200 percent of the strike 
assets needed to conduct the air attack on hand, it would appear that a strike 
could have been militarily feasible. 
C. THEATER MISSILE CHARACTERISTICS AND EMPLOYMENT 
TECHNIQUES 
Despite the U.S. technical superiority in intelligence collection, locating 
TMs is extremely difficult. The case studies demonstrate that TMs fired from 
fixed sites have been difficult to locate and destroy. The U.S. military has no 
experience locating or destroying modem, highly mobile, easily concealed, and 
self-contained TMs.73 These TM characteristics make them difficult to locate 
prior to launch. Theater missile employment techniques, including the use of 
deception, decoys, dispersal, and using civilians as shields, also make locating 
and destroying TMs prior to launch difficult. As proven in the Persian Gulf 
War, despite their flaming datum launch signatures, the military was still 
unsuccessful locating, attacking, and destroying TELs after launch. 
'13'fhe design of the Iraqi SCUD missile dates back to 1962. Modern TMs are more mobile, concealable, and 
self-contained. 
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D. THE PROLIFERATION OF THEATER MISSILES AND WEAPONS OF 
MASS DESTRUCTION 
The proliferation of TMs throughout the world means the United States 
must be prepared to defend its assets and vital interests around the world every 
time it faces a potential aggressor. Even states that would not otherwise be a 
threat can become so by acquiring TMs and threatening their neighbors with 
them. Combine the proliferation of TMs with the proliferation of WMDs, and 
the costs and interests calculations quickly tip in favor of an aggressor state. 
As long as a potential aggressor state has not yet acquired a second-strike TM 
WMD capability, the U.S. military could probably eliminate a limited TM WMD 
threat. To eliminate that threat, all U.S. military assets and capabilities must 
be synergistically focused on a potential aggressor state's limited TM WMD 
capability. For the military to do otherwise is to invite disaster. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The TM threat exists today. Immediate steps must be taken to improve 
U.S. JTMD capabilities. This thesis demonstrates that no one service or asset 
has the capability to singly conduct attack operations against TMs. Some form 
of ground force is necessary to provide "eyes on target" before, during, and after 
attack operations against TMs. As Roving Sands 95 has begun to demonstrate, 
SOF can provide those "eyes." Without those "eyes," the chances of failure are 
too great. The proliferation and increased lethality of TMs makes them too 
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